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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE IDEOLOGY OF FRANÇOIS DUVALIER

by



ERIC H. CUSHWAY

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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EDMONTON, ALBERTA

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend
to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a
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submitted by Eric Cushway
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

To my loving parents and my darling wife, Crystal.

ABSTRACT

This study is an analysis of the ideology of François Duvalier as set out in his essays and speeches.

Duvalier was a product of the U.S. Occupation's successful program to create a Haitian middle class. This embryonic middle class, although partially drawn from the previously ascendant mulatto elite, tended to be dominated by blacks. A nationalistic movement grew out of this middle class. At first its writings focused on the removal of U.S. occupation forces from Haiti. A split between the upper mulatto class and the black middle class occurred after the U.S. withdrew. The mulattoes resumed their social, economic and political policies. A group of black middle class intellectuals, including Duvalier, blamed the mulattoes for all the past ills of the nation and the poor living conditions of the peasants who made up two thirds of the nation. The blacks demanded an end to mulatto exclusivism and the rise of an "authentic" black leader aligned with the black peasant masses.

The first part of the study (1789-1804) sets out the historical, social, economic and political background of the mulattoes, the black middle class, and the black peasants. The second part (1804-1915) then examines mulatto hegemony after independence and the socio-economic system that evolved prior to 1915. The third part (1915-1946) discusses the U.S. Occupation, the rise of separate mulatto and black nationalist movements, the struggle between the two and the eventual seizure of power by the black middle class. The final section examines

in detail François Duvalier's contribution to the intellectual movement in the 1930's and 40's by analyzing his writings. The study concludes with an analysis of Duvalier's writings as a key to understanding his political acts.

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INTRODUCTION.

This study examines the evolution of François Duvalier's social and political thought. No one, I think, will disagree that one may gain a clearer understanding of President Duvalier, as well as of the black middle class that brought him to power, by a careful review of Duvalier's writings. This thesis attempts such a review, in order to examine Duvalier's ideas as they are expressed in his works. It is not generally recognized that Duvalier was part of an intellectual movement, to which he actively contributed by his writings; on the contrary, people tend to associate him solely with his repeated use of terror and of voodoo. Thus the popular image of Duvalier is that of a voodoo witch doctor, a political mystic resorting to brute force to maintain his position and power.

In order to put Duvalier and his years in power in a proper context it is necessary to carefully analyze his writings. In them can be found keys to his political acts which make him not a mystic voodoo witch doctor, but a human being caught up in, and a product of, Haiti's attempt to develop politically and socially. On a broader scale the study is meant to illustrate the dynamics of the process of cultural identification in the face of a threatening colonial heritage.

The study of Duvalier's works poses some difficulties, the principal of which is his writing style or technique. Duvalier wrote in an antiquarian Louis XIV style and the majority of his publications consisted of scattered essays which were neither collected nor

satisfactorily edited. This thesis required as a prerequisite, therefore the synthesis of these literary fragments.

I believe this essay is the first attempt by any student to trace his ideas to their origins, although David Nicholls, in his numerous articles, comes close at times to accomplishing the task. Much of my analysis is historical. The importance of history to the mulatto and black power contenders will, I believe, become obvious to the reader as the study progresses.

There is very little recorded information on François Duvalier's childhood. He was born in 1907 in a lower middle class district of Port-au-Prince. His father was a primary school teacher who later became a magistrate. His mother was a barefoot bakery employee. Old timers of Port-au-Prince, who remembered the young Duvalier, characterized him as a "quiet introverted boy, who did not play games [and who] liked to be alone ..."¹

There was much political corruption and instability in the society which formed the background of Duvalier's youth. For example, the Director of the National Bank had embezzled one million dollars with the assistance of three former cabinet ministers. A Haitian debt to certain international banks, at the beginning of the Twentieth Century

¹. Bernard Diederich and Al Burt, Papa Doc: The Truth about Haiti Today (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969), p. 35.

was responsible for continuous gun-boat threats from French, German and U.S. governments. Furthermore, German nationals living in Haiti instigated more political instability by their practice of underwriting revolutions for as little as \$30,000.²

Diederich and Burt's description of the numerous presidential changes in the first eight years of Duvalier's life summarizes the violent chaos and instability inherent in Haitian politics. They wrote:

When Duvalier was one year old General Antoine Simone overthrew Alexis. He was four when a revolution ousted Simon and five when an explosion reduced the old wooden palais national and President Cincinnatus Leconte along with it to splinters. Duvalier was six when President Tancrede Auguste was poisoned; his funeral was interrupted when two generals began fighting over his succession.... One Michael Orestes got the job, but he was overthrown the following year by a man named Zomar who in turn fell a year later to Davilmar Theodore.... As a boy of eight, Duvalier had a front row seat to the American Occupation.³

Although Duvalier was perhaps too young to grasp the political meaning behind this chaos, nevertheless he cannot have failed to sense the turmoil of his environment.

Duvalier attended local schools, finishing his secondary education in 1928 at the Lycée Pétion. He completed his medical training at the Ecole de Médecine at the Université de Haiti. Dr. Jean Price-Mars and Louis Holly, two of the founders of the Haitian Noiriste⁴

2.

Robert I. Rotberg with Christopher K. Clague, Haiti: The Politics of Squalor (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971), p. 104.

3.

Diederich and Burt, Papa Doc, p. 30.

4.

Discussed in Chapter 111 below.

movement, and Dumarsais Estimé, who was to become president (in 1946) as head of the black social revolution, were three of Duvalier's high school teachers. Duvalier was greatly affected by the Nationalist writings of the Price-Mars and Holly⁵, so that their philosophy too became a part of his intellectual environment. Price-Mars was an outspoken critic of the parasitic elites which disdained the masses, and his ethnological and historical study of the peasants and their folklore (including their voodoo) was fundamental to Duvalier's intellectual schooling. Holly's writings also were significant in Duvalier's early perceptions of society and politics.⁶ Holly wrote on the origins of a nation's mentalité (character), and he urged the Republic to transform its mentalité from a Gallo-Latine to an African one by destroying French culture and outlook, and by adopting the social system of the nation's majority. This meant a chaotic mixture of the foreign-dominated Roman Catholic Church with that symbol of the masses, voodoo.

The views of his two teachers were further impressed upon the twenty-two year old Duvalier by his meeting with Lorimer Denis. Denis was described by Rotberg as a twenty-four year old voodoo mystic.⁷ This contact marked the beginning of Duvalier's serious interest in the Noiriste movement.

5.
Discussed in Chapter 111 below.

6.
Discussed in Chapter 111 below.

7.
Rotberg, Politics of Squalor, p. 163.

Using Price-Mars' ethnological and historical works and Holly's writings on the Haitian mentalité as their basis, Duvalier and Denis wrote many essays discussing the causes of the Republic's continuous political instability and corruption. Their articles also dealt with the changes needed to restore order. The theories of certain European ethnologists and sociologists were used to support their conclusions.⁸ Their texts also formed the ideological base for the nascent black middle class in Haiti, which pursued political power but was prevented from seizing it by the existing mulatto elite, a group which owned its position in part to an ideology which tended to exclude blacks. To combat mulatto elitism therefore, black ideology was forced to counter the mulatto doctrines. The mulatto dogma relied extensively on an interpretation of Haitian history according to which mulattoes were the only ones fit to rule. The black ideology attempted to disprove this self-proclaimed hegemony not only by countering with an alternative historical interpretation, but also by a supposedly more scientific explanation of historical and social facts.

Attitudes to color are the base of these two ideologies, although the mulattoes refuse to admit to this. The black masses have a creole proverb "neg riche ce mulat; mulat ce neg" (a rich negro is a mulatto; a poor mulatto is a negro)⁹, which expresses not only the value placed upon color, but a public awareness of the situation. Color attitudes,

8. Discussed in Chapter III below.

9. David Nicholls, "Biology and Politics in Haiti," Race, XIII, No. 2 (October, 1971), p. 304.

it will be seen, have their roots in the earliest colonial days and in the struggle for independence.

One cannot understand Duvalier nor the black middle class that brought him to power without a knowledge of Duvalier's writings. This is not to say that there was a completely reasoned philosophic attitude behind his dictatorial and terroristic regime. Clearly, Duvalier's ruthless actions were motivated primarily by his desire to remain in power. However, he did use his writings (which emphasized the significance of the color schism) as effective political weapons against the mulattoes. All the ills of the nation were blamed on the mulatto and his traditional color prejudice. Duvalier's government which emphasized strong dictatorial leadership, and his version of nationalism, which eulogized the peasant and his voodoo religion, were first verbalized and given respectability in his writings.

The first chapter of this study provides an historical description of the social position of the mulatto and black slaves in colonial Haiti. It is followed by an analysis of the role played by both groups in the struggle against France for Haitian independence. The significance of this background becomes obvious to the reader in the second Chapter, which describes the social system that developed after independence. The mulattoes found themselves in control of the political and social system even though they did not play a significant role in the fight for independence. This situation resulted in a deliberate re-writing of independence and post-independence history,

to show that the mulattoes were leaders in the independence struggle, and to eulogize the mulatto leaders while criticizing the black leaders. This "history" becomes part of the mulatto ideology which is also examined briefly in Chapter Two. The role of certain black leaders is also discussed, since a number of black presidents become important to the "black legend" expounded by Duvalier and Denis, a legend examined in the third chapter of this work.

Chapter Three analyzes the rise of the nationalist movement which followed the U.S. Occupation, and examines the color split within this nationalist movement; it deals with the return of mulatto presidencies and their policy of exclusivism, an event coinciding with the rise of a new black middle class which seized power in 1946.

Chapters Four and Five analyze Duvalier's social and political thought which is fundamental to the black ideology and also compares briefly his ideological writings with his later actions as President of Haiti.

CHAPTER I

There are two principal aspects of Haitian political development, an understanding of which is necessary to the present study. The first is the class or caste type of socio-economic and political system that emerged prior to the 1915 U.S. Occupation of the island. The second is the contrasting ideologies and world views of the elite and the peasants. Analysis will show that the class division was based primarily on color of skin. The lighter-skinned mulattoes occupied all important economic and political positions, with the majority of the blacks excluded from any leadership except the military. It will be necessary to describe how the mulatto historians re-interpreted Haiti's struggle for independence in order to legitimate their socio-economic and political authority.

This re-interpretation of history is important when we consider the numerical strength of the slaves, and the significance is particularly pointed when we realize that competent black leaders like Toussaint L'Ouverture, Jean-Jacque Dessalines, and Henri Christophe were the key actors in Haiti's independence struggle. In view of the latter fact, the mulatto's interpretation of historical events is insupportable as an historical account. Instead, it is an historical exegesis transformed into dogma to justify the mulatto oligarchic system of government and "to encourage Haitians to unite under the leadership of the most patriotic, civilized and technically qualified group in the country, to legitimate the mulatto ascendancy in the social and economic field and to lend weight to their claim to guide and

control developments in the political sphere."¹ In other words, their "historical analysis" was absorbed uncritically into the whole of mulatto folk ideology.²

This use or abuse of history by mulattoes becomes in turn a key theme in the rise of the black middle class and their successful challenge to mulatto elite hegemony following the political collapse of Haiti in 1915. For as Rémy Bastien points out, "national disaster usually calls for a reappraisal of the socio-cultural values which failed to avert it. The past is put in the dock and found guilty without appeal."³ In this case, mulatto folk-history and socio-cultural values are tried and condemned. The new black middle class, created in part by the Americans' successful educational program, set itself to write a contrasting view of the Haitian history, and its social and political institutions.

Clearly, what is required by the reader wishing to understand the class struggle of post 1915 Haiti, is a factual understanding of Haitian colonial history. This involves an appreciation of the actual role played by the mulattoes and blacks during the chaotic struggle for independence from 1789 to 1804; the type of rule practiced by Dessalines, Christophe, and by the schismatic mulatto-controlled south;

1.

David Nicholls, "A Work of Combat: Mulatto and the Haitian Past, 1847-1867, Journal of Inter American Studies and World Affairs, XVI, No. 1 (February, 1974), p. 24.

2.

This ideology will be discussed in detail at the end of this chapter together with the world view of the mulatto elite. The black's self image will be contrasted with the mulatto ideology at a later point.

3.

Harold Courlander and Rémy Bastien, Religion and Politics in Haiti (Washington: Institute for Cross-Cultural Research, 1966), p. 54.

and the events in seventeenth-century Haiti which resulted in the creation of two nations, one a predominantly urban, mulatto Europeanized cultured, Catholic, French-speaking nation in control of the economic and political institutions, the other largely a black, rural-living, African-centered, voodoo-worshipping, Creole speaking group that lived in isolation from the affairs of the nation and the international world.

Haiti, in its colonial period (1697-1804) known as Saint-Domingue, was at the time France's wealthiest colony. A rigid colonial caste system existed there, in which admixture of white and black blood determined social status. The population was made up as follows:

- (1) The bureaucrats of the colonial government who administered the financial and administrative affairs for the absolute monarchy. These officials did not allow any form of political participation by the grands blancs, the petits blancs, or the mulattoes. They openly despised the petits blancs, the mulattoes, and the slaves, while merely tolerating the grands blancs.
- (2) Grands blancs, Frenchmen born in France, or in Haiti (creoles), government officials, important whites - owners of large plantations, wealthy merchants; and the petits blancs who were men of smaller means and less social importance - "shopkeepers, artisans, small planters with only a few slaves, little people busily engaged in social climbing, and shiftless whites lazily slipping downhill."⁴
- (3) Affranchis (mulattoes) or freedmen,⁵ were sons of white fathers and African or mulatto mothers. They were often rich landowners, who sent their sons to France to be educated. However, they were excluded from public office. It is important

⁴. James G. Leyburn, The Haitian People (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), p. 16.

⁵. These free people of color achieved their emancipation under the 1685 Code Noir, Article 59, which specified that when a slave secured his liberty, either by cash purchase or as a gift of his white master or parent, he was to be regarded as a full French citizen. He might own land, dispose of his wealth as he pleased, vote, bear arms, travel where he wished, embrace any career and own slaves or free them.' ibid.

to notice that many of these gens de couleur had not known slavery for⁶ at least two generations by the time of the Revolution. Many of these mulattoes had formed close social and economic associations with the grands blancs since the Code Noir had enabled them to become quite wealthy through inheritance and economic enterprise. Their ownership of large plantations and slaves was to result in bitter jealousy by petits blancs. It is estimated that by the time of the Revolution in 1789, the mulattoes owned one third of the land and one fourth of the slaves in Haiti.

- (4) Slaves. This included both household slaves and field hands. These Africans were indiscriminately herded together on plantations without distinction of language or social culture. Thus they were a very uncohesive group, having only servitude and color in common.

The social relationship between these groups became increasingly strained up to the eve of the Revolution. The grands blancs feared the petits blancs' increasing jealousy while the petits blancs disliked this class of large white plantation owners and the equally privileged cultured-mulatto class. The jealousy and anger of the petits blancs against the mulattoes culminated in the gradual establishment of racial laws directed against the mulattoes and rescinding the rights gained for them under the Code Noir. Rodman accurately summarizes the erosion of the mulatto position:

One by one the mulattoes' rights in the Code were abrogated. He might not fill any responsible office either in courts or the militia, for that would elevate him above the white persons. Certain careers, such as goldsmithing, were closed to him because they brought wealth; others, notably medicine and the apothecary's art, were forbidden on the grounds that whites might

⁶. Ibid., p. 17.

⁷. Selden Rodman, Haiti: The Black Republic (New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1954), p. 7.

be poisoned; law and religion were barred to him because of their public and honorific nature. Colored women were forbidden in 1768 to marry white men. In 1779 began a series of laws designed to humiliate the colored persons in public: his clothes must be of a different material and cut from the white person's; he must be indoors by nine o'clock in the evening; he might not sit in the same section of churches and theatres with whites.⁸

In any case the grands blancs must have concurred at least passively with the successful petits blancs campaign to lower the status of the highly Europeanized mulatto. Colonial administrators and the large white plantation owners undoubtedly feared the wealthy mulattoes. Médéric-Louis-Elie Moreau de Saint-Méry estimated the population's make-up in 1789 as:

Whites	40,000	(8%)
Free men of color (mulatto)	28,000	(5%) ⁹
Slaves	452,000	(87%)

The French Revolution not only caused disintegration within France, it brought about the spread of a dangerous ideology to colonies such as Saint-Domingue. Both the petits blancs and the mulattoes did nothing to allay or even recognize the seething discontent among the slaves.

The petits blancs were in the vanguard of the democratic attack on France's economic and political domination of the colonies. At the beginning, the settler aristocracy joined this movement against French authoritarianism. The mulattoes, because of the petits blancs' exclusivism,

⁸. Ibid., pp. 19-20.

⁹. Médéric-Louis-Elie Moreau de Saint-Méry, Description Topographique Physique, Civile, Politique et Historique de la Partie Francaise de l'Isle de Saint-Domingue (Philadelphia, 1797), I, p. 28.

opposed the two white groups and took the metropole's side in the dispute. However, eventually the grands blancs were to join with the mulattoes against the petits blancs, an alliance which resulted eventually in warfare.

In 1789, the petits blancs, gained the right to place 37 delegates in the National Assembly. The mulattoes in turn attempted to establish equality with the whites under the "Declaration of Rights of Man", demanding that they be allowed to select some of the colonial delegation. The Amis des Noirs, a movement struggling for abolition of slavery, fought the mulattoes' case, in the belief that mulatto emancipation was a first step in the fight to eliminate slavery and racial discrimination entirely from the island. The Amis des Noirs succeeded partially in their campaign on behalf of the mulattoes, for the National Assembly passed a resolution which, while apparently granting political rights to colored people, nevertheless left the interpretation of the grant to already-existing colonial authorities. The petits blancs would not allow the mulattoes to take up their six seats. The large white settler class and the white bureaucracy acted in what was to be an exceptional and rare alliance to back the petits blancs objection. The numerical strength and superior economic position of the mulattoes, coupled with their interest in the new liberal ideology, must have prompted this unusual coalition. Equality of mulattoes with whites might lead to eventual loss of the whites' economic and political hegemony. Mulattoes in alliance with slaves cannot have been an attractive proposition to the whites, who feared the possible independence of the island

However, the Ogé affair demonstrated forcefully that the mulattoes had no intention of changing the slave plantation system. Vincent Ogé's actions are of crucial importance in the conflicting interpretations of the class struggle generated in post 1915 Haiti, and for the blacks' interpretation of Haitian history. Vincent Ogé and Marc Chavannes were two mulattoes who attempted in vain to plead the mulatto case for full citizenship under Article 59 of the Code Noir, including representation in the National Assembly. Ogé's utter frustration led him, in 1790, to take up arms with 700 mulattoes against the colony. It is significant that Ogé did not include any slaves in his group. In fact, Ogé's letter to the Provisional Assembly in the North, makes his position clear regarding the slaves' emancipation. He wrote "that he wanted the gens de couleur included in the instructions of March 28 and that he did not 'include ... the Negro in slavery!'" ¹⁰ Ogé's force was quickly defeated by the whites. The brutal execution of Ogé and Chavannes by white authorities was followed by a purge that resulted in 200 more executions.¹¹ Ogé's death stirred up bitter feelings in Paris. He became a popular hero among Frenchmen, who now agreed with the Amis des Noirs that the National Assembly should take action on the "Mulatto Question" and grant them their rights. A decree of May, 1791 (granting some mulattoes full rights) was interpreted by the white colonists to mean all mulattoes. Colonial deputies, while acting energetically to have the act repealed were at the same time able to frustrate a mulatto decision to follow Ogé's example en masse; a serious insurrection was averted. Meanwhile, during

10. Thomas Ott, The Haitian Revolution 1789-1804 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1973), p. 37.

11. Ibid.

these two years 1789 to 1791, the slaves remained on the side-lines watching the progressive chaos and anarchy that resulted from the Colonial Administration's inability to solve the dispute raging among the three factions.

In 1791 another event occurred, one which would have a significant effect on Haiti's history. In that year, a slave named Boukman, from the Northern plain, "[used] the informal network of vodun (voodoo) priests, and the mystery of ritual, to acquire and retain the support of 40,000 slaves throughout northern Saint-Domingue."¹² These people embarked upon a rampage of revenge and revolt, killing whites, raping, pillaging and burning plantations. Ott declares that Boukman's slave revolt "spread like wild fire and that perhaps as many as 100,000 were involved in the Northern province."¹³ There is very little detail known about this uprising. It has been somewhat romanticized by Haitians. However, as Leyburn writes:

The certain facts are there: on the night of August 14, 1791, at a pretended Vodun ceremony in the woods of the Turpin plantation, during a violent storm, several wily and powerful slaves laid plans for a general uprising. Their intentions were communicated apparently by drum signals, to neighbouring plantations. Six days later the attack began, the blacks in that section of the North indiscriminately slaughtering every white man, woman and child on whom they could lay their hands. From this center the massacre spread, accompanied by general arson, until practically every plantation in the fertile northern plain was a shambles.¹⁴

Thus voodoo established itself as the communicative device uniting

¹². Rotberg, Politics of Squalor, p. 42.

¹³. Ott, The Haitian Revolution, p. 40.

¹⁴. Leyburn, The Haitian People, p. 23.

Africans of quite diverse social and geographic origins. Shortly, all the rural areas of the colony were dominated by roaming loosely-coordinated slave bands. In the conflict, the brutality of the blacks was countered by a similar savagery on the part of the whites.

On the role of the mulattoes during the slave uprising, Rodman states that "the mulattoes, with no alternative, tried at first to make friends with the leaders of the Blacks and turn the insurrection to their advantage."¹⁵ However, many mulattoes on seeing the utter anarchy in the situation joined the whites. The rationalization for coming to the aid of the whites is well expressed by Ott. He writes: "Many gens de couleur of Le Cap François unexpectedly came to the aid of the whites, took firearms from the king's store, and killed many insurgents. After all, equality with whites might be their reward."¹⁶

André Rigaud is prominent in the annals of the Haitian independence struggle. This mulatto led a group of his own people and thousands of slaves and maroons ("the Swiss")¹⁷ in rebellion in the Western Province. The mulattoes' alliance with the blacks was to prove merely a move of expedience, however, and two incidents of late 1791 emphasized the mulattoes' continuing intention to gain equality with the whites while maintaining the slave system. The facts offer additional evidence to contradict the subsequent mulatto legend which depicted

15. Rodman, Haiti: The Black Republic, p. 4.

16. Ott, The Haitian Revolution, p. 49.

17. The maroons were known as "the Swiss" in imitation of Louis XIV's bodyguard. ibid., p. 51.

the mulattoes as in the vanguard of the independence struggle. Ott writes:

On September 13, 4,000 mulattoes laid seige to Port-au-Prince, last major stronghold of the whites in the West Province. But the gens de couleur found it distasteful that the slaves, their comrades in arms, might gain equality with them. They wanted to join the grands blancs, not destroy them. Therefore the mulattoes offered Humus de Jumecourt and Coutard, leaders of the white planters their assistance in suppressing the slaves. With this agreement, "the mulattoes turned on all the Negroes who had come to their aid." Among the whites, the petits blancs found the new alliance most objectionable. Yet with the black men storming the walls of Port-au-Prince even they saw its immediate necessity. On September 14 the gens de couleur gave a public dinner for the whites, and afterwards they went arm in arm to Mass and sang the Te Deum. The bargain became official for all Saint-Dominique on September 20 when the Colonial Assembly not only recognized the May Decree, but applied it to all mulattoes, regardless of their parentage.¹⁸

No sooner had the whites and mulattoes fought off the attack then the whites forgot their promise of equality. Hence, once again the mulattoes of the West Province joined the blacks.

The whites feared almost certain destruction when this army of 1,500 mulattoes and another 20,000 slaves pressed toward Port-au-Prince. The whites quickly resurrected their promise to the mulattoes, but with the provision that the mulattoes turn over their faithful allies "The Swiss" to the whites. Ott comments "the new agreement was not without dishonor for the mulattoes."¹⁹ The black revolutionary "Swiss" were subsequently executed by the whites. This event will be seen as fundamental to the black historian's interpretation of the

18. Ibid., pp. 17-18.

19. Ibid., p. 52 .

independence struggle. This period (1792 to mid-1793) can be summarized by stating that conditions of civil war and anarchic violence prevailed. All attempts at negotiating some sort of settlement or detente among the grands blancs, petits blancs and mulattoes ultimately failed. At the same time, the lack of black leadership excluded any possibility of a military settlement.

By mid 1793, however, three new elements had joined the struggle, the first of which was intervening foreign powers. England, fearing that the slave rebellion would spread to Jamaica, invaded Saint-Dominque. Spain, seeing the rebellion as a chance to gain possession of the Western end of Hispaniola, began giving aid and encouragement to the slaves' rebellion. The second feature added to the chaotic situation was Toussaint L'Ouverture. Toussaint was an educated black slave who quickly became the leader of a new emerging black army. His army and such subordinate officers as Jean Jacques Dessalines and Henri Christophe joined the Spanish, who offered the support the blacks' bid for freedom. The third new dimension was the arrival of a Jacobian Commissioner from France named Léger Félicité Sonthanax. Sonthanax believed the only way to bring stability to the colony was to "root out royalism".²⁰ The relentless purges carried out by Sonthanax drove many white to look to England for security. Sonthanax reacted to the whites' overtures to the English by attempting to gain mulatto support through such measures as: (1) making Rigaud Commander-in-Chief of the South and allowing him to kill whites, and (2) offering the slaves freedom in return for their support. This emancipation offer

20.

Ibid., pp. 67-68.

was made official by the National Convention on February 4, 1794 after much prodding by Sonthanax.²¹ Historical reporting of Toussaint's role in the colony's struggle for independence must be carefully scrutinized.

The mulatto historians of mid nineteenth century Haiti argued that this black general was a "tool of the whites" and that he harboured "a passionate hatred of mulattoes".²² In fact, the mulatto historian J. St. Rémy would contend that the mulatto general Rigaud rather than Toussaint was "the true radical - enemy of the whites and the advocate of full independence."²³ It has already been seen that the new black middle class of the U.S. Occupation later disputed the mulatto interpretation of Haitian history.

The American historian Thomas O. Ott, in his carefully researched book, The Haitian Revolution 1789-1804, cites Lacroix' Mémoires in referring to the exchange of French for Spanish allegiance. He writes: "The Convention's abolition of slavery, according to Lacroix, 'persuaded Toussaint to join Laveaux, for now France had taken the lead in the Negroes' interest'."²⁴ Ott adds that Toussaint was both a power seeker and an abolitionist who believed he could control the old General Étienne Laveaux more easily than he could the Spanish. Hence Toussaint swiftly attacked the Spanish in early May, 1794, afterward making his change of allegiance official in a letter to Laveaux.

21. Ibid., pp. 82-83.

22. Nicholls, "A Work of Combat," p. 23.

23. Ibid., p. 30.

24. Ott, The Haitian Revolution, p. 83.

"In this document marked for public consumption, Toussaint claimed that he had fought on the side of the Spaniards for Negro freedom. The Spanish, he maintained, refused to liberate the blacks and 'have caused us to fight each other in order to diminish our members and to overwhelm the remainder with chains.' Toussaint also made it clear that he had respect and sympathy for the suffering whites."²⁵

Toussaint showed himself to be an excellent military commander against the Spanish while Rigaud conducted a campaign against the British in the South. By the beginning of 1796 Toussaint dominated much of the Northern and Western provinces.²⁶ Meanwhile, Rigaud, the mulatto commander in the South, was defeating the British.

It has already been mentioned that Toussaint sought power. He aspired to fill the power vacuum that began to appear as European dominance gradually declined in Saint-Domingue. Thus by 1796 a power struggle had begun to develop between the black general Toussaint and the mulatto general Rigaud. Ott offers the reader some interesting evidence that Rigaud, at the height of his influence, "began to demonstrate the qualities of command that marked him an inferior to Toussaint."²⁷ Unlike Toussaint, Rigaud was not able to unite the mulattoes, whites, and blacks in his zones of occupation. Furthermore, he did not believe that all colors deserved equality in Saint-Domingue. Ott describes

25. Nicholls, "A Work of Combat", p. 30.

26. The Spanish officially ended their participation in July, 1795.

27. Ott, The Haitian Revolution, p. 85.

Rigaud's color prejudice in general terms writing:

Rigaud personified the mulatto drive for vengeance and saw little use for blacks or whites. When mulatto forces lost a battle, he would often blame defeat on the whites in his ranks; sometimes he even resorted to mass executions of the "traitors". Nor did the blacks fare much better. One insurgent leader, General Dudnait, was so angry at Rigaud and the mulattoes that he offered²⁹ to join the British to destroy the gens de couleur.

Toussaint advocated a policy of unification until the eve of open civil warfare against Rigaud and the mulattoes in 1799. It was at this time that Toussaint made his famous anti-mulatto speech in the cathedral.

Rigaud wanted to guarantee mulatto supremacy, and saw that the French Governor Laveaux was the basis of Toussaint's rising power. Rigaud turned for support to Villatte, a mulatto commander of Le Cap Francois, who had failed to remove Toussaint. Rigaud and Villatte now planned to imprison Laveaux. Ott reveals that there were "two clear implications in the plot: the mulattoes planned to inherit the former position of the whites and that slavery itself might be restored."²⁹

The mulatto thrust turned into a devastating defeat for them, and a powerful victory for Toussaint, who led an army of 10,000 men to the gates of the prison and demanded the French Governor's release. The mulattoes released Laveaux and Villatte fled. The grateful Governor's action in making Toussaint Lieutenant Governor, further thwarted Rigaud's rise to power. Toussaint was now able to build up his military strength. He was able to persuade the aging Governor to take a

²⁸. Ibid., p. 86.

²⁹. Ibid., p. 87.

position as the island's representative in Paris. Laveaux's departure would have put Toussaint in supreme control of the colony if the Jacobian Sonthanax had not then returned.

Sonthanax, the emancipator of the slaves, posed a threat to Toussaint's drive to power. However, Toussaint capitalized on his hatred of the whites whom Sonthanax believed to be royalists. "Unlike Toussaint, Sonthanax did not consider that the future of Saint-Domingue depended upon both black and white."³⁰ Toussaint was able to promote himself to the Paris council, as the sole defender of French interests. Hence Toussaint's diplomatic success, coupled with anti-Sonthanax sentiments in the Paris Council, resulted in the Commissioner's recall to France. Sonthanax desperately attempted to prevent the imminent collapse of his power by making Toussaint Governor-General in the place of the departed Laveaux in May, 1797. But Toussaint did not alter his plan to have Sonthanax removed from the colony, and the latter was returned to France in the dubious role of island representative. By 1799 only Rigaud remained as a threat to Toussaint's control of Saint-Dominique.

The dispute which finally sparked the civil war was Rigaud's accusation that Toussaint was disloyal to France. This charge by Rigaud was founded on the treaty between Toussaint and the British, ending hostilities against the colony in return for Toussaint's promise not to invade Jamaica. Toussaint in return accused Rigaud of insubordination. Rigaud refused to accept Toussaint's self-assumed legal authority. Finally, the South under Rigaud broke off relations with Toussaint in

30. Ibid., p. 89.

the North and prepared to fight. The speeches of the two leaders to their followers both attempted to demonstrate beyond a doubt that the civil war was a class conflict based on color. Here is how General Rigaud inflamed the people of Saint-Domingue: "Brothers of the South, know it well, there exists in the country two classes of men, the disgusting and incapable class, and the sympathetic and intelligent class. Let us be of the latter, and let us chase the former to the mountains where its home is destined to be, so far from our life, among inferior beings incapable of society. . ."³¹ Leyburn offers us an understanding of the people whom Rigaud spoke. He writes that "in 1793 when the French Commissioners had abolished slavery in Saint-Domingue, the action had been as distasteful to the free colored people as it was to the whites; both groups wanted to continue to own slaves; the gens de couleur merely wanted their share also in governing the colony. In their opinion, the struggle was getting out of hand. They gave their allegiance, consequently, not to Toussaint, but to their own man, Rigaud."³²

Contrast the Rigaud speech with that of Toussaint delivered in the church of Port Republican where he ascended the pulpit and said:

People of colour, who since the beginning of the revolution have betrayed the blacks, what do you want today? No one is ignorant of it; you want to command the colony as masters; you want the extermination of the whites and the enslavement of the blacks' But consider it, you perverse men

31. George F. Tyson, Toussaint L'Ouverture (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1973), pp. 166-167.

32. Leyburn, The Haitian People, p. 25.

forever dishonored by the deportation and then the slaughter of the black troops known under the denomination of "Swiss." Have you hesitated to sacrifice to the hatred of the petits blancs those unfortunates who had shed their blood for your cause? Why have you sacrificed them? It is because they were black. Why does General Rigaud refuse to obey me? It is because I am black. It is because he has sworn me an implacable hatred because of my color. Why else would he refuse to obey, a French General like himself, who has contributed more than anyone else to the expulsion of the English. Men of color, because of your foolish pride, because of your perfidy, you have already lost your share of political power. As for General Rigaud, he is lost. I see him at the bottom of an abyss; rebel and traitor to the Country, he will be devoured by the troops of liberty. Mulattoes, will he continue? I see in the depth of your souls that you were ready to rise against me; but although all the troops are incessantly leaving the Western province, I leave there my eye and my arms; my eye to watch³³ you, and my arms that will know how to strike you....

After he had shattered the resistance of the mulattoes, Toussaint turned the struggle from them and rooted the Spanish out of Santo Domingo - the Spanish section of the island.

Toussaint consolidated his hegemony over all the island under his Constitution of 1801. This Constitution made him Governor-General for life with the power to name his successor. It abolished slavery although forcing the former slaves to work on the plantations for a share of the profits. A special provision was also made for Catholicism, which became recognized as the State religion. Voodoo, the religion whose communication network was used in the 1791 uprising was to be abolished. (Toussaint himself was a devout Catholic). Believing that the whites were necessary for their administrative and technical abilities, Toussaint invited them back to the island. Although

33. Tyson, Toussaint L'Ouverture, p.167.

distrusting the mulattoes for their refusal to ally themselves with the rising blacks, Toussaint had no plans to exterminate them. Finally, the Constitution did not grant independence to the island.

Toussaint maintained the colony's dominion status although there was no provision for a French agent. This lack of a representative from the metropole was interpreted as a direct challenge by Napoleon who, believing that Toussaint was leading the island to complete independence, sent in an invasion force.

It is important to emphasize that the mulattoes in the beginning were of considerable aid to the French invasion forces. "Alexandre Pétion and Rigaud, along with other mulatto exiles, were utilized by the French for their knowledge of Saint-Dominque and to organize the gens de couleur against the blacks."³⁴ However, the French General Charles Victor Emmanuel LeClerc alienated Rigaud and other mulattoes and these gens de couleur subsequently took up arms against the French.

After much fighting Toussaint surrendered. He came to terms with LeClerc because some of his best generals, including Christophe and Dessalines, had defected, and also because the newly declared peace in Europe meant that France could direct all her military energy toward the recovering of Saint-Domingue. However, black secondary commanders continued to fight against LeClerc. An epidemic of yellow fever forced LeClerc and his army to rely more and more on the defectors Dessalines and Christophe for the execution of secret policies. These

34.

Ott, The Haitian Revolution, p. 147.

policies included disarming of the whites and blacks, and, eventually, the repeal of Sonthonax's 1794 decree abolishing slavery. (A policy of which Dessalines and Christophe were totally unaware). But the kidnapping and deportation of Toussaint by LeClerc alerted many blacks to LeClerc's aim of re-enslavement. And at this point too, the mulattoes joined the growing number of rebels against the French General. Ott suggests that it was the increasing cruelty of the French which drove the mulattoes to the side of the blacks.³⁵ The French became desperate, plagued figuratively by the increasing rebellions and literally by yellow fever. Dessalines, with the British as allies, was able to eliminate the French and declare Haiti's independence on 1 January, 1804.

³⁵. Ibid., p. 149.

CHAPTER II

The struggle for independence between 1789-1804 involved three groups. At the beginning, hoping to secure equality, the gens de couleur or mulattoes fought against the whites. The slaves entered this dispute in 1791, and for the following two years, violence and property destruction by all three groups were common events. By 1793, the black ex-slave Toussaint exercised supreme leadership in the struggle, and had eliminated the foreign powers, briefly returning to economic prosperity and re-establishing social control after the military defeat of the mulatto General Rigaud. Toussaint paved the way for the country's independence, which was accomplished by Dessalines in 1804 with his victory over the French army. This last struggle left the country in a state of economic weakness. The plantations and sugar mills were almost completely destroyed. Nevertheless, the slaves and mulattoes had now asserted their independence and were faced with the opportunity - and the responsibility - of building a new social order.

This section of my study analyzes the emergence of the mulattoes, who controlled the political decision-making and the major wealth of the country, while maintaining the black peasants as almost a separate nation. An understanding of the mentalité or world-view held by the peasants and mulattoes prior to the 1915 U.S. Occupation, together with some examination of the socio-economic and political

history of Haiti, will illuminate the intellectual, social, and political dilemma of the black middle class which was to emerge. This background is vital if we are to analyze the militant ideology of François Duvalier.

Jean Jacques Dessalines (1804-1806), and Henri Christophe (1806-1818), his successor, were the first two black rulers of independent Haiti. Their type of rule and social system was in contrast to the secessionist Southern Kingdom of the mulatto Alexandre Pétion (1806-1818). When the country was re-united in 1820 under the mulatto President Jean-Pierre Boyer (1820-1843), it adopted the southern social system.

Dessalines and his successor Christophe attempted to return Haiti to its former position of wealth. To this end, the newly freed slaves were relegated to their former subjugation. Strict laws, enforced by the military, forbade any idleness or dissent; however, the whip of colonial days was eliminated and the black laborers were supposed to receive a one-third share of the profits.¹ Dessalines was more tyrannical than Christophe, and his preference for force rather than persuasion eventually led to his assassination, possibly at the hands of the mulattoes led by Pétion.² In contrast, Christophe ruled largely by his persuasive powers, and only later in his regime did he resort to tyrannical practices to prevent blacks from deserting to Pétion's southern domain.

Mulattoes occupied most of the administrative and diplomatic positions

1. H. P. Davis, Black Democracy: The Story of Haiti (New York: The Dial Press, 1929), p. 97.

2. Leyburn, The Haitian People, p. 37.

in this autocratic state, simply because they were able to read and write.³ No attempt was made during the reign of Dessalines to create an educational program for the laboring class.⁴ In contrast, Christophe went so far as to import teachers and inaugurate a limited education program. However, the children of the aristocrats were the only ones to benefit from these measures, since the children of cultivators were busy on the plantations.⁵

This type of economic system, which bound the workers to the land in a state near serfdom and without educational opportunities had serious social repercussions. Use of the military to enforce the mulattoes' administration made worse this social pattern of suppression and violence. Leyburn saw clearly the implication of this situation when he wrote:

Here lay the basis of a persistent Haitian attitude of mind: to work with one's hands is to show oneself a member of the masses; to direct others is the distinction of the upper class.⁶

Thus the direction of the two leaders fixed the shape of Haitian life. It is true that their rule brought prosperity to the island once again; but it was to be a short lived prosperity at best. The nation under Pétion and Boyer would not follow an economic policy based on discipline, hard work and feudal control. Instead, the Pétion-Boyer ruling system "of persuasion, laissez-faire, and small properties"⁷ was to prevail.

3. Rodman, Haiti, p. 16.

4. Leyburn, The Haitian People, p. 41.

5. Ibid., p. 49.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., p. 42.

Pétion led his mulattoes in rebellion against Christophe following the assassination of Dessalines. The "mulattoes had agreed among themselves that they had enough of rule by ignorant ex-slaves."⁸ Pétion remains one of the most respected presidents among the blacks because of his land policy.

The majority of southerners were serfs living under Dessalines' militaristic reign. However, by the time of Pétion's death, twelve years later, the southern blacks had become peasants. This new social "status" was created by Pétion's order to break up the plantations, a policy which commenced with the return to the mulattoes of land confiscated under Dessalines. Soldiers too were given fifteen acres each of the state's lands. "Eventually most of the rest of the public domain was either put on sale at such moderate prices that thousands of humble Haitians might purchase their bit, or was effectively occupied by people who 'squatted' far up in the hills, out of official view."⁹

At the same time two policies were introduced, to maintain the large estates or plantations in the absence of slavery, and also to conform with Pétion's dislike of force. One practice was the securing of labor through a crop-sharing system; it was thought that with coercion eliminated, the tenants would gladly work on the estates. But this removal of coercion failed to motivate the workers, who tended their own vegetable gardens and in some cases deliberately sabotaged the plantation system.¹⁰ The use of daily labor to operate the plantations

8. Ibid., p. 42.

9. Ibid., p. 56.

10. Ibid., p. 57.

met with no better success. Proprietors were used to a slave or forced-labour system, and Pétion's laws protecting the worker offered no simple method for handling liberated work-force. Leyburn cogently summarizes the dilemma of proprietors and their solution: , ,

Finding it expensive to maintain sugar machinery, impossible to engage docile workers, and necessary to finance social security, most of the aristocrats simply took the easier path of leasing their estates¹¹ into small subdivisions getting out of them what they could.

Pétion's system of persuasion, laissez-faire and small properties thus resulted in eroding the economic power of the mulatto class, and the creation from the former slaves of a new peasant class. The economy of Haiti was also drastically altered; wild untended coffee plants and improperly cultivated cane sugar became the major export crop.¹² The decline of sugar as the major source of hard currency was followed by a decrease in both the value and productivity of property, especially so with the continued subdivision of the land and the disappearance of forced labour.

The mulatto Boyer came to power in the South following Pétion's death in 1818, and reunited the Republic in 1820 after the death of Christophe. Like Pétion, he believed that a laissez-faire attitude without use of force was the method best suited to creating an industrious working-class. This policy led to the quick break-up of the state-owned plantation systems of Christophe's north.

Boyer persisted in this policy until 1825 when, faced with the almost total depletion of the state coffers, he finally admitted that his

¹¹. Ibid., p. 59 .

¹². Rodman, Haiti, p. 19.

economic policy was a failure. The ideal of a new "industrious common folk" had failed to emerge as expected. Political pressure was brought to bear on Boyer for the immediate return of the masses from their vegetable gardens to the plantations. Boyer took the insistent advice of his aristocrat land-owning cabinet and passed laws re-instituting a coercive system of agricultural labour. This legislation appeared as the 1826 Code Rural, and was very similar to that of Dessalines and Christophe. The intention was to regulate the newly created peasant's life by forcing him "to engage himself by an authentic contract to the service of a proprietor or lessee for not less than three years and not more than nine years."¹³ The government official, craftsman, large landowner, children of the land laborer were not allowed to leave the land either to attend school or to apprentice in a town, without the written permission of a court. As it had in the earlier regimes of the black presidents, the army was to enforce Boyer's system. The workers were to receive a proportion of the crop as wages.

Reaction to the Code by all workers was one of indifference and general apathy; no one - not even the military - took the act seriously. Leyburn suggests that the soldiers' unconcern might have been due to the peace treaty signed recently with France, a document which emphatically excluded the possibility of any further invasion by the French.¹⁴ Another reason for the failure of the Code was that most of the large plantations had been divided under Pétion's regime. A revolution might have re-united the divided lands, but the Code Rural failed totally.

13. Leyburn, The Haitian People, p. 67.

14. Ibid.

Money for the national coffers was lacking. The fall of world coffee prices worsened the government's situation,¹⁵ and already-depressed land values sank to the point where the elite moved to the towns, leaving to the "squatters" Haiti's major economic resource - its agriculture. The state lands soon followed this pattern as well, and by 1842 not a single plantation of the size common in the colonial era remained intact.¹⁶

Boyer's color policy was as much a failure as his Code Rural. He was not as skillful as Pétion had been in moderating the social antagonism between mulattoes and blacks.¹⁷ In fact, during his twenty-five year rule "class distinctions became fixed, in large part although not wholly, on the basis of color."¹⁸

The class separation between mulattoes and blacks was, in the main, a function of the agricultural policy of Pétion and Boyer; to a lesser degree it arose from the inadequacy of their public education program.¹⁹ The absence of a mass-education scheme resulted in the fixing of social status upon the black ex-slaves, a status from which little "vertical" movement was possible. For it was from the educated group that positions in the government bureaucracy were filled. At first, Boyer did attempt where possible to put an end to jealousies by consistently promoting a black for every promotion of a mulatto or

15. Ibid., p. 69.

16. Ibid., p. 75.

17. Ibid., p. 6.

18. Ibid., p. 79.

19. Ibid., p. 81.

other light skinned person. His intentions were inevitably frustrated however, when the system failed to supply educated blacks for the vacant posts. This situation left Boyer with no other choice than to promote men of his own complexion.²⁰

Meanwhile, the peasant class continued to grow, unimpeded by attempts to return the country to a forced labour system like that of Dessalines or of Christophe. The land continued to be subdivided, until it was reduced to the present day minifundia system.²¹ The geomorphology of Haiti - namely that of a mountainous country with isolated valleys - allowed the peasant to maintain his isolation and develop and protect his culture. At the center of his culture were voodoo beliefs and the Creole language. Voodoo, the folk-religion of the slaves, "embodies a core of deeply rooted Africanist beliefs and mode of cognition."²² It will be remembered that voodoo was the medium uniting the slaves in their rebellion of 1791. This informal and decentralized religious system was forcefully suppressed by Dessalines and Christophe. But under Boyer and Pétion the religion went largely unchallenged in the isolated mountains. Nearly all of the Catholic clergy had left the island with the defeated French in 1804 and they did not return until the signing of a new Concordat in 1862. Hence, the peasant religion had more than two generations in which to implant

20. Ibid., p. 79.

21. Note that today the land has been divided and re-divided so much that over 50% of the peasants own between 1 1/2 - 6 hectares of land. Paul Morál; Le Paysan haitien: Études sur la vie rurale en Haiti (Paris: Pichon, 1961), p. xv.

22. Courlander and Bastien, Religion and Politics in Haiti, p. xv.

itself without hindrance in the Haitian countryside. The virtual absence of an educational system prior to the return of the church missionaries allowed the Creole language to replace French as the medium of communication among the predominantly black class.

The black peasant shunned the government. With his personal title to the land very much in dispute, and with the memory of a harsh plantation system still vivid, he considered it best to remain aloof politically as well as socially. The peasant saw no need for education; to own a small piece of land was sufficient. As Robert Rotberg summarized it, "... Haiti became a land of small holdings, black, Creole-speaking peasants; more interested in subsistence than in producing for the cash economy, divorced from the mulatto-dominated towns, and isolated from the main currents of change elsewhere."²³

From this contented ignorance and tribalism the mulattoes emerged as an unquestioned elite, for whom the colour of skin was an obsession and a measure of high society. Endogamous marriages became the social rule of this elite to perpetuate their light skin and the family name. This group did not wish to identify itself with the blacks on the land. Questions of economic development through education of the predominantly lower-class black peasant did not concern the mulatto; rather, he identified himself with France and with French culture, and occupied himself with the affairs and "spoils" of government. Playing the game of politics for financial gain (such as that derived from government monopolies like the customs houses) was his only concern. The political game included the black generals²⁴ only in so far as

²³. Rotberg, Politics of Squalor, pp. 62-63.

²⁴. The military was the only institution where an illiterate Negro could advance to senior ranks.

they served as "front" men for the mulatto elite. The social historian James G. Leyburn best characterizes the control exercised by this mulatto elite over government and finances.

The envied minority, jealously guarding their distinction, were generally conscious of prejudices which they rationalized with pronouncements about superior mentality and innate qualities. They would concede the difference between an educated black and a mere peasant, but would still cling to the feeling that all the culture in the world would not make the educated negro a peer of the mulatto.²⁵

The mulatto claims to intellectual superiority and to possession of innate qualities were reinforced by the exclusion of the black's version of Haiti's independence struggle from history books appearing between the years 1847 and 1867.²⁶ These historical accounts, written by mulattoes, were "designed to legitimize the mulatto ascendancy in the economic and social field, and to reinforce their claims to political leadership or control."²⁷ They were an attempt to replace the tribal, oral and/or metaphysical justifications of racialism with a more literate historical version of their dogma of supremacy.

Beaubrun Ardouin and Joseph St. Rémy were the two major proponents of the traditional mulatto-elite interpretation of the past.²⁸ These writers wanted their histories to reflect, if not actually to

25. Leyburn, The Haitian People, p. 80. Emphasis in the original.

26. See David Nicholls, "A Work of Combat: Mulatto Historians and the Haitian Past, 1847-1867," Journal of Inter American Studies and World Affairs, XVI, No. 1 (February, 1974).

27. Ibid., p. 19.

28. Ibid., p. 21.

create, a national unity and a vindication of the mulatto ascendance. Color, class or caste distinctions between Haitians were denied. Instead, they stressed the notion that all Haitians belong to a single family and all are descendants of the African race. Ardouin wrote of his refusal to accept the term "caste" to describe the Haitian social system after independence: "During the colonial regime it was possible to speak of castes, but after the abolition of slavery in 1793 'the interests have always been the same for all men of the black race'."²⁹ He affirmed the irresponsibility of those people who concluded, on the basis of a few isolated incidents, that a general rivalry existed between blacks and mulattoes.³⁰ He subscribed to the use of the words "black" and "mulatto" only in a descriptive categorical sense and not as terms denoting a social division. Ardouin argued that the French continually fostered antagonism between blacks and whites to maintain their hegemony in the colony. The French perpetuated their supreme position by a policy of divide and rule. Toussaint was described as the major tool of the whites for the instigation of class antagonism between mulatto and black.³¹

It is important that the reader recall here Toussaint's crucial role during the struggle for independence, in order to recognize the task facing the mulatto historians. For they had to neutralize Toussaint's significance and portray the Affranchis or mulattoes as the real liberators and guarantors of the nation's independence, first

²⁹. Ardouin as quoted in Nicholls "A Work of Combat," p. 27, emphasis added.

³⁰. Ardouin as quoted in ibid., p. 28.

³¹. Ardouin as quoted in ibid., pp. 27-28.

diluting the image of their social and economic position during the colonial regime. (The Affranchis had in fact owned one third of the land and one quarter of the slaves; a majority of mulattoes enjoyed a prominent position when compared with that of the slaves, most of whom were black. Mulatto historians must somehow obscure these facts.)

Ardouin admitted that the Affranchis shared common economic interests with the blancs. Both groups owned plantations and slaves and therefore both had "an interest in maintaining the colonial regime."³² However, this dual alliance or allegiance of the Affranchis could be explained by "the racial discrimination under which they laboured, which bound them to 'the unfortunate slaves'. This meant that the Affranchis had a powerful interest in being reconciled with the latter (the slaves) and uniting with them to break the colonial yoke'."³³ Ardouin maintained that the duality of interest of the mulattoes explains why they played a role fôr and against the slaves during the revolutionary struggle. According to this interpretation, their loyalty to the slaves ultimately proved the stronger "and although this group had to act in a manner which was politic, its predominant interest was in overthrowing colonialism, which was a constant fact influencing its actions and commitments."³⁴ St. Rémy's account of the social and economic role of the Affranchis is even less accurate than Ardouin's. He describes this group as being "composed of

32. Ardouin as quoted in ibid., p. 28.

33. Ardouin as quoted in ibid.

34. Ardouin as quoted in ibid., p. 29.

mulattoes and blacks" who were engaged in small-scale farming and in manual work, thus seriously misrepresenting their true social and economic situation. Like Ardouin, he over-stresses the harsh disabilities suffered by this "poor caste of coloured people," in comparing them to the slaves.³⁵ In brief, Ardouin and St. Rémy describe the Affranchis as a suffering and oppressed group and not as a prosperous ally of the blancs. They continue their analyses by suggesting that Toussaint's role in Haitian independence was a detrimental one. Ardouin depicted Toussaint as "the blind instrument of metropolitan policy,"³⁶ and accused him of being a reactionary and a principal of the counter-revolutionaries, basing these allegations on Toussaint's absolutist rule and his attempt to restore the plantation system with the aid of the whites.³⁷

St. Rémy's description is not as harsh. He draws an ambivalent picture, both admiring and condemning; he strongly criticizes the black general's prejudice against the mulattoes and his "league with the colonists to re-establish slavery under the form of the glebe."³⁸ He goes on to write that the mulatto Rigaud, and not Toussaint, was the true revolutionary, the leader in the struggle for independence from the whites.³⁹

35. St. Rémy as quoted in ibid., p. 29 .

36. Ardouin as quoted in ibid., p. 30 .

37. Ardouin as quoted in ibid.

38. St. Rémy as quoted in ibid.

39. St. Rémy as quoted in ibid.

The black presidents Dessalines and Christophe were paradoxically criticized and lauded with equal vigor, while the mulatto presidents Pétion and Boyer were described as proponents of justice and liberalism. Dessalines was honored as the great father of Haitian independence⁴⁰ and at the same time pictured as a brutal, despotic, and fierce opponent of the free men of color. St. Rémy commented on his tyrannical government by writing that "the black masses of our countryside ... in the impartiality of their understanding, in the recesses of their hearts," could not but celebrate his death with joy.⁴¹ It will be remembered by the reader that Dessalines confiscated most of the plantation property and forced the former slaves to cultivate the crops. Hence this appraisal of public sentiment against Dessalines may not be too greatly exaggerated. The same can be said of Christophe. He was described as arbitrary, unpredictable, color-prejudiced, and conspiratorial.⁴² The mulatto historians contrast his form of rule in the North with that of Pétion in the south. Christophe was arbitrary and autocratic while Pétion was liberal and democratic. St. Rémy wrote that Christophe had adopted a "despotic" regime in 1806 and that he clearly had no respect for liberty. In Christophe's system St. Rémy saw reflected the French colonial one. In contrast to Christophe, Pétion was "almost a god to his fellow citizens."⁴³ Ardouin eagerly pointed to Pétion's "generous"

40. Ardouin as quoted in ibid., p. 31.

41. St. Rémy as quoted in ibid., p. 31.

42. St. Rémy as quoted in ibid.

43. St. Rémy as quoted in ibid., p. 33.

program of land distribution and sale as proof of his enlightened spirit.⁴⁴

Ardouin insisted that the civil war between these two leaders was not a war of color or caste. Instead, he argued, it "was ignited by the disastrous ambition of Henri Christophe"⁴⁵ and that the conflict in styles of government was "the unique cause of the war".⁴⁶ Ardouin affirmed his statement that it was not a color war by stressing that blacks as well as mulattoes fought against Christophe.⁴⁷

Boyer "was the emulator of Pétion and his magnanimous successor."⁴⁸ It is significant that there is no mention of Boyer's catastrophic Code Rural. Instead, Ardouin describes Boyer as continuing Pétion's program, and insists that the re-unification of the nation after Christophe's death was evidence of the "superiority of a legal regime over despotism, or justice over tyranny."⁴⁹

In brief, the mulatto interpretation of the country's history "views Haiti as a symbol of black dignity, where black and mulatto - all sons of Africa - live in harmony under the leadership of the most enlightened class, which is that group descended from the ancien libres."⁵⁰

44. Ardouin as quoted in ibid., pp. 31-32.

45. Ardouin as quoted in ibid.

46. Ardouin as quoted in ibid.

47. Ardouin as quoted in ibid., p. 32.

48. Ardouin as quoted in ibid., p. 34.

49. Ardouin as quoted in ibid.

50. Ardouin as quoted in ibid.

Ardouin wrote in detail regarding the mulatto ascendancy:

As these citizens formed the most enlightened class in the nation, since the independence of the country they were naturally called to occupy a large number of public offices, in concurrence with (he added, perhaps as an afterthought) those emancipated in 1793.⁵¹

Thus these writers justified their control over the economic and political institutions on the grounds that their system was democratic and egalitarian.

It has already been pointed out that the mulatto elite chose the European system or model to be imitated. More particularly, it was decided that Haiti should use France and not Africa as its example. The reasoning was not founded on notions of racial inequality; the elite believed that there existed no marked difference between the numerous branches of the human family. St. Rémy argued that

the mixing of civilizations and races leads to strength and progress. Referring to the countries of Western Europe, St. Rémy demanded: "was not the primitive blood of the races of these different countries mixed with the blood of the conquering races?"⁵²

Nevertheless, while the historians insisted that there existed no superior races, they did recognize superior civilizations. Ardouin has reported their views on European civilization:

Religion, family life, and the property system lie at the base of social life. In these matters the civilization which Haiti must aspire to follow is that of Christian nations, and of France above all, rather than adopting or encouraging the customs of Africa.⁵³

51. Ardouin as quoted in ibid., p. 34.

52. St. Rémy as quoted in ibid., p. 35.

53. Ardouin as quoted in ibid.

Ardouin aimed directly at the voodoo religion, portraying it as a survival of barbarism and superstition. He believed that the cult should be "rooted out" on the grounds that it deterred progress and civilization. "It perpetuates barbarism in the black population," Ardouin wrote, adding however that superstition was not restricted only to the black race but was also found in earlier Europeans.⁵⁴ In brief, not only voodoo but all African institutions and customs were believed to be barbarous or at best primitive.

Black intellectuals like Janvier, Firmin, and Charmant were to question and defend their black African heritage later in the nineteenth century. But their writings are in the nature of a defense directed against the charges of racial inequality with the mulattoes. Janvier went so far as to deny the existence of the voodoo religion, so keen was he to prove to his readers that Haiti was a civilized country.⁵⁵ All of the writers supported the mulattoes' contention that a European model was the one to follow. For them, the issue was merely which European example should be chosen - the Gallo Latin or the Anglo-Saxon.

François Duvalier and his school were to lead a real defense of Africa and to declare open preference for the African model. The choice was based partially upon their rejection of the mulattoes' historical account of events between 1789 and 1843. But further Duvalier reacted against the propaganda of the colored elite, with its distortion of events between the so-called "1843 revolution" and the 1915 American

54. Ardouin as quoted in ibid., p. 35.

55. Janvier as quoted in ibid., p. 36.

Occupation. Duvalier and Denis outlined a different version of events, the black legend, in their book Problème des Classes à travers l'Histoire d'Haiti.⁵⁶ Their work was appealing in that it proposed a workable design for arguing historically the superiority of black leaders like Toussaint, Dessalines and Christophe. The Duvalier group wished to portray Pierrot, Soulouque, Salnave, Salomon, Simon as the true representatives of the masses, while depicting the mulatto presidents and politicians (often acting behind an aged and illiterate black puppet president, La politique de doublure) as betraying the people while using political office for personal monetary gain.

Little would be gained in this study by tracing the succession of Haitian presidents and revolutions from the 1843 mulatto rebellion to the 1915 U.S. Occupation. These seventy-two years from an era of ephemeral governments, during which twenty-two heads of state took and gave up office: three died in office; two retired; three were murdered; seventeen were driven out by coups d'etat; and eleven served terms of less than one year. It would be more useful to analyze the regimes of those presidents receiving special attention by François Duvalier, and by Lorimer Denis, an occasional co-author of Duvalier's works.

Duvalier and Denis gave particular attention to the black presidents: Faustin Soulouque (1847-1859), Sylvain Salnave (1867-1869), Louis Lysius Félicité Salomon (1879-1888), to exclusion of Boisrand Canal, Boyer-Bozelais, and Antoine Simon (1908-1911). Duvalier described these

⁵⁶. François Duvalier and Lorimer Denis, Problème des Classes à travers l'Histoire d'Haiti (Port-au-Prince: Au Service de Jeunesse, 1948) Also see Duvalier's first volume of Oeuvres essentielles: I. Eléments d'une doctrine (Port-au-Prince: Presses Nationales d'Haiti, 1968), for further black historical interpretation of the period from 1789-1915.

presidents as: "men of action", "democratic men", "revolutionaries", "lovers of the masses", "fighters against the evil tendencies of the bourgeoisie",⁵⁷ and he placed them in the golden pages of Haitian history rather than in its black annals. These presidents, along with Toussaint, Dessalines, and Christophe "constitute the living continuity of the Haitian nation".⁵⁸

The significant point is that the Duvalier school believed the mulatto presidents, like Pétion and Boyer, ruined Haiti; for the elite politicians on the other hand, Haiti's misfortunes are to be traced to the often semi-illiterate black presidents who ruled Haiti intermittently, from 1843 until the U.S. invasion of 1915.

If the U.S. historians of the period are consulted on the regimes of the black presidents, their accounts will be seen to tend toward the mulatto interpretation especially when compared with the more recent U.S. historian Murdo J. MacLeod's careful re-evaluation of President Faustin Soulouque. In any events, these two contrasting versions afford an opportunity to assess more fully the historical position of Duvalier and Denis.

The mulatto historians viewed the schism in their caste, which had led to the revolution of 1843, as one of the greatest tragedies in their racial history. A power struggle, initiated by younger mulattoes discontent with the continuing economic stagnation of Haiti, induced the largely negro army to enter the dispute as a contender for power. The

57. Duvalier and Denis, Problème des Classes, p. 66.

58. Duvalier, Oeuvres essentielles, p. 244.

59. Nicholls, "A Work of Combat", p, 24.

split evolved simultaneously with rebellions among the frustrated black masses in the South. These two incidents resulted in the emergence of "the color factor which had played an important but subordinate role in Haitian politics since colonial days", and which now assumed major proportions as "the arbiter of events."⁶⁰ The dissent was also instrumental in the elevation of the semi-illiterate black generals, who became the rulers of Haiti for all but eight of the next seventy-two years. Most of these presidents had their power curtailed under the revised 1843 Constitution, a document providing for a parliamentary government, and subordinating the military to the civil powers. Such democracy was too radical for either elite or army to endure, and this constitution was often modified.

The first two presidents were aged illiterate black generals, neither of whom lasted more than a year⁶¹ (General Charles Herard, 1843-44; and General Philippe Guerrier 1844-45). President General Jean-Louis Pierrot (1845-46) became president at the height of a racial crisis. Public feelings were so inflamed that Pierrot found it necessary to introduce a "Race Relations Act" to prevent the use of color as a political weapon by various elite groups jousting for power. The Act stated:

Any person whatever who indulges in idle talk about color likely to spread dissention among Haitians and to provoke citizens one against another will be arrested and delivered to the courts.⁶²

The legislation was aimed at peasant leaders like Louis Jacques Acaau and his opponents. The retirement of the aged Pierrot brought General Jean

⁶⁰. Ibid., p. 18.

⁶¹. These two presidents died natural deaths while in office.

Baptiste Riche' to power. His attempt to reinstate the 1816 version of the constitution (which allowed the president to rule for life) was never debated since he died a natural death eleven months after assuming the presidency.

The U.S. historian Selden Rodman describes these four black presidents of the period 1844 to 1859 as incompetents, one of whom, Faustin Soulouque,⁶³ was notoriously so. In a similar manner, the eminent social historian James G. Leyburn characterized Soulouque's assumption of power as "marking the beginning of a twelve year nightmare for Haiti."⁶⁴

The following account is typical of the U.S. historians' descriptions of Soulouque's regime. He was chosen president only after the Senate was unable to agree on a successor, "whereupon one Senator proposed the name of an ignorant, entirely unillustrious black General-Faustin Soulouque."⁶⁵ The choice was supposedly temporary and it was made on the basis that the Senator "saw in this complete nonentity a chance for another government of understudies";⁶⁶ Soulouque suited the need for "a man who would be completely subservient to his sponsors."⁶⁷

According to legend Soulouque had often been the victim of jokes by Boyer and others. Hence, those who were sent to inform him of his election had an extremely difficult task convincing him this was not yet another practical joke.⁶⁸

62. Madiou as quoted in Nicholls, "A Work of Combat", p. 19.

63. Rodman, Haiti, p. 20.

64. Leyburn, The Haitian People, p. 91.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., p. 91, emphasis in the original.

67. Davis, Black Democracy, p. 120.

68. Some sixteen years before, when news was brought to Boyer that an insurrection had started against him in the South, he had prophesied a period of disorder and is said to have remarked that "any man in Haiti may become president of the Republic, even that stupid negro over there, "pointing to Soulouque, then an officer of the guards. Soulouque is reported to have

Unlike his predecessors, however, he did not become a tool of the elite. In fact, Soulouque suppressed an attempted mulatto coup in the first year and "brutally" massacred every mulatto connected with the plot. One individual described the Country after the massacre by stating that "the Republic had the calm tranquility of a tomb."⁶⁹ Soulouque consolidated his power by purging the army of mulatto supporters and replacing them with men loyal only to himself. He removed mulatto cabinet members and appointed "less qualified darker-skinned men of his own choice."⁷⁰ He organized two new forces to prevent any further attempted coups. One of his innovations for social control was a secret police; a second was a parliamentary terroristic group called Zinglins. The capital lived in fear of Soulouque and his machinery of terror which included the use of assassination as a political weapon and the arbitrary murder of distinguished persons critical of his regime.⁷¹ Soulouque in a sense exemplified all the qualities of a cunning politician as well as those of a merciless tyrant. He revived the title once assumed by Dessalines and turned himself into Emperor Faustin I. But he went one step further than Dessalines, in that he actually set up a court. Leyburn describes this court as "merely outward pomp which was given no economic functions to perform but which was just to gratify

68. Con't. answered, "Please, Mr. President, don't make a fool of me." Ibid., p. 119.

69. Jean Pierre Gingras, Duvalier, Caribbean Cyclone (New York: Exposition Press, 1967), p. 42. Also quoted in Leyburn, The Haitian People, p. 92.

70. Nicholls, "A Work of Combat," p. 20.

71. Rotberg, Politics of Squalor, p. 84.

the Emperor's own vanity."⁷² Soulouque also enhanced his prestige with the masses by allowing the open practices of voodoo.⁷³ It is also reported that he practiced the religion in his palace and paid homage to the gods (loas) while visiting various parts of the country.

MacLeod argues that

certain paradoxes and incongruities exist in these historical accounts of Soulouque's regime: Why, for example, were his potential enemies so quickly eliminated after his election? Was he a much abler politician than has been supposed, or did he find a surprising amount of support for his policies among the general populace? . . . Why have Soulouque's attempts to incorporate the Dominican area been so condemned, but not similar attempts by other leaders? The final and most obvious inconsistency . . . is how this alleged dullard, given to posturing, frivolity, viciousness and adventurism managed to stay in power for twelve years, when other able Haitian presidents, some using force, some trying permissiveness, found it difficult to survive for months.⁷⁴

MacLeod suggests that at the beginning Soulouque did follow the pattern set by the aged black generals who had ruled since Boyer's fall, and who allowed the elitist bureaucracies and mercantile urban groups an implicit if not an explicit power. Whatever his original design however, Soulouque did not maintain this pattern and as we have seen, quickly consolidated his own position secure from mulatto control. He was sensitive to his uneducated servile past and disliked having to submit himself to the ridicule of the educated domestic and foreign community.

72. Leyburn, The Haitian People, p. 92.

73. It will be remembered that this peasant religion had been harshly censured under Toussaint, Dessalines, and Christophe and only tolerated under Pétion and Boyer's mulatto rule.

74. Murdo J. MacLeod, "The Soulouque Regime in Haiti, 1847-1859: A Re-evaluation, "Caribbean Studies, X, No. 3 (October, 1970), p. 37.

This feeling was reinforced by constant warnings from the black military leaders "that he was rapidly losing the support of his own people."⁷⁵ Soulouque became alarmed at the vulnerability to foreign interests of the faction-ridden fragmented state. Rebellions within the country had drastically weakened it in the past four years. It is also probable that Soulouque's ex-slave status made him obsessively insistent upon Haiti's independence from foreign (white) rule.⁷⁶ As a result, Soulouque believed that his first task was to protect his completely exposed southern flank by recapturing the secessionist Dominican Republic.

MacLeod is perhaps correct in suggesting that Soulouque has been singled out by most Haitian and U.S. historians for his massacre of the mulattoes.⁷⁷ This does not imply that MacLeod condones cruelty and violent tyranny; she asks simply why Soulouque is singled out, while his successor General Fabre Geffard, who conducted killings sixteen at a time, is not. Why are Geffard's murders "an execution" while Soulouque's are termed a "massacre"?⁷⁸ MacLeod suggests as a possible answer that "in some foreigners" condemnations of Soulouque there are heavy racial overtones, and a great deal of frustration at his surprising lack of docility in diplomatic negotiations."⁷⁹

75. Ibid., p. 38, emphasis in the original.

76. There was some concrete cause for his concern - the slave-owning United States, at the height of its Manifest Destiny, had recently seized an unoccupied island of Navasse.

77. MacLeod, "Soulouque", p. 41.

79. Ibid.

The European Colonial powers and slave-holders in the United States were also anxious because of Soulouque's Pan-Africanism. His encouragement of Africans, Indians and freed men from the United States to settle in Haiti, and his denial of the privilege to whites (who could neither own property nor become citizens) could not fail to antagonize.

Both Nicholls⁸⁰ and MacLeod⁸¹ have denied that Soulouque was racist, suggesting that the mulatto program has led to this verdict on Soulouque. In their argument they name several mulattoes who held posts in Soulouque's cabinet. However, Nicholls does admit that Soulouque followed "the black tradition".⁸²

Soulouque's decision to change the small country into an empire with himself as Emperor Faustin I, met with ridicule at home and abroad. One historian suggested that this type of government had a certain appeal to the people, and reminded his readers that Haiti was "only half a century removed from slavery, a slavery where the only truly emancipated class had been the bearers of titles of nobility. It was, therefore, a symbol of true independence to see their new leaders, many of them ex-slaves, now holding noble titles of their own."⁸³ However, most historians have taken Leyburn's position, stated earlier in this

80. Nicholls, "A Work of Combat", p. 19.

81. MacLeod, "Soulouque", pp. 41-42.

82. Nicholls, "A Work of Combat", p. 19.

83. Dhormoys, ... as quoted in MacLeod, "Soulouque", p. 43.

study. MacLeod convincingly argues against the claim of Leyburn et al that Soulouque's court was entirely frivolous. She writes that "it was mostly an office holding class, with cabinet members, local commanders and generals becoming transformed into dukes, counts and Marquises."⁸⁴ These titles were, in fact, given to anyone of influence or importance, anyone who could command a following of any size, including rural leaders, merchants, members of local voodoo hierarchies, all of whom thus became officially attached to the regime. MacLeod suggests that most of these people existed on salaries "pitifully small" and that many "were being rewarded with prestige rather than cash and this visible prestige made it much more difficult to revolt against the Emperor."⁸⁵ In any event, MacLeod maintains that Fabre Geffard's regime was probably a greater drain on the national coffers than that of Faustin, whose "bread and circuses", were somewhat balanced by his frugal coronation ceremony in 1853.

Soulouque's open support and encouragement of voodoo is judged by MacLeod as a demonstration of the Emperor's "pragmatic reality about resources of power and influence inside his nation."⁸⁶ She suggests that whatever Soulouque's reasons for supporting voodoo, whether from personal conviction, his wife's influence, or from tactical considerations, the religion was a valuable instrument of social control. It will be

84. Ibid., p. 44.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

remembered that the mulatto elite did its utmost to withdraw from the "barbaric" religion and even to deny its existence to the international community. Whatever the reason, Soulouque's open support of the religion "did bring tranquility to the nation for a decade."⁸⁸ Threats by the United States, by the French and British, including gun-boat diplomacy, did not encourage Haiti to repay foreign loans:

Using the skilfull Duc de Tiburan and his nationalist Minister of Finance Etienne Félicité Salomon, later to be president, Faustin was largely successful. Constant pressure, visits from men-of-war, forced signing of agreements on the French indemnity⁸⁹ and loan, accomplished little for the three powers.

Soulouque, although his foreign policy was largely a success, was unable to match this diplomatic success with a military victory over the Dominican Republic. He was utterly inadequate as a general and his third Dominican defeat (1855-56), coupled with the coffee crop failure and the decline of international prices resulted in a shift from "harsh repression of all dissent" to complete indifference in Soulouque. General Geffard capitalized on Soulouque's behavioural inconsistency and carried out a successful coup.

MacLeod concludes her carefully researched examination of Soulouque by stating (I believe correctly) that although the Emperor was a cruel and tyrannical ruler, he

showed himself to be far more than the clown which we usually find depicted In every case we must conclude that Faustin Soulouque was a man of high intelligence, a

88. Ibid., p. 45.

89. Ibid.

realist, a pragmatic, and a superb if ruthless politician and diplomat. There is no denying his patriotism and his ability to impose domestic tranquility.⁹⁰

We shall later find that Duvalier also attacked the derogatory mulatto interpretations of Soulouque's reign.

A military coup in 1859 finally ended Soulouque's rule. The two issues that led directly to his collapse were the decline in the economy and the more immediate "ill-advised and disastrous"⁹¹ military campaign waged against the Dominicans. General Fabre Nicolás Geffard, who led the successful coup against Soulouque, succeeded to the presidency in 1859 and allowed the mulattoes an opportunity to regain the political predominance which they had lost following the 1843 split. Probably the most important event to occur during Geffard's rule (1859-1867) was the signing in 1860 of a Concordat with the Vatican. This document made way for the return of the clergy and their teaching orders. Geffard's dissolution of the legislature in 1862, and his assumption of the presidency for life, eventually resulted in a successful coup led by General Sylvain Salnave (1867-1869).

Salnave's presidency, according to some writers, signals the point at which Haiti began to follow the typical Latin American pattern of domestic politics.⁹² A politician gained the presidency usually through force, after accusing the incumbent president of having assumed dictatorial rule. These fights for supremacy rarely involved other constitutional principles than the length of the term of office. In the 1870's, there

⁹⁰. Ibid., p. 47.

⁹¹. Ibid., p. 48.

⁹². William W. Pierson and Federico G. Gil, Governments of Latin America (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957), pp. 167-170.

emerged the Liberal and the National Parties. The main distinguishing feature of these two parties was that the Liberals favored a parliamentary system with a heavier emphasis on the vote and responsible Cabinet Government, while the Nationalists believed in the sole rule of a strong dictator.⁹³ The Liberals, in advocating extended suffrage, were paradoxical when one considers that one of their basic tenets was that "men were not created equal; rather than certain men (the elite) were clearly the superiors of others."⁹⁶ The educated Liberals (mulattoes) intended to use the constitutions, laws, codes, and debating chamber to legitimize their control over the black generals.

Rotberg describes Salnave's government as being reductio ad absurdum.⁹⁵ Salnave changed his role within a few weeks as a member of the provisional government and became "Protector of the Republic" wielding "the powers of a dictator."⁹⁶ He was later elected president under the newly-revised constitution which again abolished the lifetime presidency and fixed the term of office at four years.

Salnave soon encountered difficulties with the legislature, whose members he accused of being in sympathy with the mulatto rebels. He led his guards into the National Assembly and put an end to its operation. He assumed complete dictatorship - suspending the constitution and re-establishing the presidency for life term. Riots followed the policies

93. Dantes Bellegarde, Histoire du peuples haitien: 1492-1952, (Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie de Compiegne, 1953), pp. 188-189.

94. Leyburn, The Haitian People, pp. 220-221.

95. Rotberg, Politics of Squalor, p. 90.

96. Davis, Black Democracy, p. 127, emphasis in the original.

in Port-au-Prince, and the legislators returned home to gather an army against this new dictator. His chaotic, short-lived regime was described by one historian as a continuous civil war in which various factions attempted to eliminate him.⁹⁷ The one new political feature introduced by Salnave was the use of cacos, undisciplined, 'untrained peasants from the north who, under local leadership, fought with little knowledge of the issues involved. Even with the support of the cacos, however, Salnave succumbed to General Nissage Saget and was executed in 1870.

From 1870 to 1879 Haiti experienced three more presidents, two of whom were soldier-statesmen while the third was a civilian. In 1879 Salomon became the country's eleventh president since the 1843 rebellion. He was elected with the support and program of the Nationalist Party, defeating the Liberal candidate Boyer Bozelais.

Salomon was characterized by the eminent mulatto historian Dantes Bellegarde as one of the best-qualified men of his generation, possessing an excellent education and extensive administrative and diplomatic experience. However, Bellegarde qualified this appraisal with the remark that Salomon lacked the flexibility needed at that time. This qualification was based on Salomon's performance during the tragic days of 22 and 23 September 1883, when he instigated a mulatto blood bath.⁹⁸

The Haitian historian's estimate of Salomon tends to coincide with that generally accepted by mulatto and U.S. historians. Salomon provided the country with its first national bank (1881), whose purpose was to give the government some central control, as well as to undermine the

97. Rotberg, Politics of Squalor, p. 91.

98. Bellegarde, Peuple haitien, p. 198.

small foreign-owned finance and credit agencies which had sprung up within the country and whose operations the government found difficult to regulate. He also liquidated the country's outstanding debt to France; made reforms in education and the military with the use of borrowed French personnel; instituted improvements in communication (especially telegraphic links); and engineered the country's participation in the Universal Postal union.

Salomon's agricultural laws are looked upon favourably by some historians. These allowed any Haitian to become a landowner if he would undertake to cultivate coffee, sugar cane, or other commercially viable crops. Leyburn writes that "critics of Salomon point out that these conditional grants were designed to make of the peasant a simple fiscal workman for the state, to force him once more to labor for the public rather than for himself. The legislators were preoccupied not with the welfare of the peasant but solely with the increase of production and of fiscal revenue."⁹⁹ Salomon's law recreated Boyer's Code, although the former was founded with a different intention. Rayford Logan describes the effect as disastrous since the state did not allot funds for the support of farmers while they waited for a first crop.¹⁰⁰ In any event, the peasants ignored the laws.

Bellegarde's earlier comment regarding Salomon's lack of flexibility was made in reference to the President's handling of the Boyer-Bozelais insurrection in 1883. This attempted coup was the culmination of more than two years of periodic, abortive attempts by the Liberals to overthrow

⁹⁹. Rayford W. Logan, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 110.

¹⁰⁰. Ibid.

Salomon. The tension between the classes, partially sustained by color differences, became quite violent. It should be emphasized that this color line was indistinct, consider for example, that some of Salomon's principal enemies were black, that he was married to a white French wife and had a mulatto daughter.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, the struggle for power was marked by violence and bloodshed based at least partly upon color and class distinctions. The negroes ransacked those areas of the capital occupied by the colored bourgeoisie.¹⁰² The number of innocent mulattoes executed in reprisal was considerable, and business came to a virtual halt in the capital.¹⁰³ Boyer-Bozelais was killed in the uprising, his death marking the permanent end of the Liberals and the so-called Parliamentary Government. Salomon's extensive campaign against the mulattoes revived a color prejudice equal to that of the Soulouque era. Salomon himself was forced into exile in 1888, when he had the constitution amended to permit his immediate re-election.

General Antoine Simon (1908-1911) was the last of the ephemeral presidents of this period, and one whom Duvalier considered among "the principle artisans of national independence."¹⁰⁴ Simon was a nearly illiterate peasant who had followed the standard path from the mud hut to the palace - through the ranks of the army. Gingras describes him as totally obsessed with the idea of developing the country "to give

101. Ibid., p. 109.

102. Ibid.

103. Rodman, Haiti, p. 22.

104. Duvalier and Denis, Probleme des Classes, p. 66.

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the unemployed employment, to sign commercial agreements with the great powers, and to build a railway."¹⁰⁵ Simon made a number of commercially harmful loans and financial agreements with foreign countries in order to carry out his industrial schemes, which included a railway.¹⁰⁶ Nevertheless, he did pave some streets, install electricity¹⁰⁷ in the capital, and modernize the docks. It is of interest that Simon, like Soulouque, gave positive support to voodoo. Bastien remarks that there is not enough information available to ascertain whether Simon controlled the cult or whether it dominated him.¹⁰⁷ His regime lasted only two years and seven months and was terminated by another military coup. The seven years prior to the U.S. occupation, beginning with Simon's presidency were characterized by anarchy and chaos.

A brief review of these black presidents reveals that they were all dictators, and sympathized with, or openly supported the black oriented Nationalist Party. Soulouque, Salnave, and Salomon altered the constitution to permit lifetime rule. They governed dictatorially and did not allow themselves to be used as "front men" for the mulatto elite group. In fact, Soulouque and Salomon carried out brutal massacres of mulattoes who challenged their power. It is also significant that Soulouque and Simon openly supported voodoo. An attempt has been made

¹⁰⁵. Gingras, Caribbean Cyclone, p. 49.

¹⁰⁶. Rotberg, Politics of Squalor, pp. 105-106.

¹⁰⁷. Courlander and Bastien, Religion and Politics in Haiti, p. 52.

here to give U.S. (which signifies mulatto) analysis of their regimes, so that the reader may appreciate Duvalier's argument that the class problem in Haiti was essentially linked with that of color.

CHAPTER III

The U.S. Occupation (1915 - 1934) was responsible for the evolution of a new black middle class and its rise to political power in 1946. By 1946 the Haitian blacks had won an ideological struggle as well as a political one. This same class, which had made possible Dumarsais Estimé's regime (1946-1950) also helped to guarantee François Duvalier's victory in 1957. It was a class quite distinct from the mulatto elite, not only in terms of social status and wealth, but more importantly by virtue of its distinct ideology. Black ideology developed out of the anti-American nationalist movement and the disdain of the blacks for the mulatto governments of President Sténio Vincent and his successor President Elie Lescot.

The immediate background of Duvalier's political writings was the mulatto led Nationalist Movement of Price-Mars with its new interest in the folklore of the Haitian masses. Duvalier and other black intellectuals split with the Cultural Nationalists and the subsequent struggle between these two groups merits attention, as does the anti-superstition campaign and the Society for the Haitian-American Development of Agriculture (S.H.A.D.A.) land deal [explained below]. The climax of the political turmoil of the period was the victory of the new black middle class and the defeat of the mulattoes and their ideology.

Many justifications of the U.S. invasion and subsequent occupation of Haiti have been offered. Insolvency coupled with German-financed political chaos have been suggested as direct threats to U.S. hegemony in the Caribbean. Haitians were pledging 80 percent of government revenues to debt service on the eve of the U.S. intervention.¹ Anarchy

¹. Hans R. Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti 1915-1934 (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1967), p. 43.

was encouraged when German businessmen floated loans at exorbitant interest rates to presidential candidates forming caco armies. To finance these mercenaries, income from the lucrative customs houses and other tax sources was diverted to the pockets of the incumbent President.² Some social scientists have suggested that economic imperialism was the major reason for U.S. intervention, "that American [U.S.] capital expected to exploit Haiti and turn it into another Cuba or Puerto Rico."³ But the U.S. historian Hans Schmidt has given what is probably an accurate explanation for the occupation. He states that the key reasons "were strategic and more specifically military."⁴ Large scale investments of U.S. capital in Cuba and Puerto Rico, plus the construction of the Panama Canal, demanded U.S. military control without French, German, or other European influence in the area. The U.S. wished to turn the Caribbean into a large American lake, an ambition requiring financially and politically stable governments without European affiliations. Economic penetration was considered only a lucrative by-product of the intervention.⁵

An anti-U.S. nationalist movement followed quickly upon the arrival of the occupation forces. At first, however, many educated mulattoes welcomed their stabilizing influence. But the gratitude was short-lived;

2. Davis, Black Democracy, pp. 149-151.

3. Courlander and Bastien, Religion and Politics in Haiti, p. 53.

4. Schmidt, U.S. Occupation, p. 56.

5. Ibid., p. 55.

even the mulattoes could not tolerate the U.S. policies and attitudes. The marine administered government was operated by paternal-authoritarian colonial precepts, which emphasized maintenance of law and order, and showed no understanding of native problems. The ruling policy was founded upon the ideas of the Progressive Reform Movement in the United States and on models such as that of the enlightened British colonial policy in Egypt. The rule of the Mexican dictator Porfiro Diaz was the model for the U.S. blueprint for remodelling Haiti.⁶ The strategy was to pull the Negro nation up by the bootstraps with great dependence on progress through technical efficiency:

American efforts to uplift and "civilize" Haiti emphasized material achievements, technological modernization, organization, and the cultivation of pragmatic as opposed to esthetic or spiritual attitudes.⁷

This U.S. emphasis on pragmatism and efficiency, with its manifestation in material achievements, was at first well-received by a few Haitians. But their inherent attitude toward manual work, and certain other such traditional values, were not to be suppressed. Conflict soon arose with the occupations racial and cultural prejudices. Marine Commander and militia Commandant of Haiti, Major Smedley D. Butler, recognized that his government's mission "was to make Haiti a first class black man's country."⁸ The way to accomplish this was to establish an authoritarian

6. Ibid., pp. 13-16.

7. Ibid., p. 13.

8. Ibid., p. 155.

regime that would initiate decisions for the good of a people who, presumably because of their prima facie racial inferiority and primitiveness, were incapable of self government. These racial and cultural pre-suppositions, coupled with the revision of nineteenth century corvee or forced road building law, could not fail to result in the emergence of an active anti-American Nationalist sentiment.

Racial and cultural intolerance were not evident at the beginning of the occupation, and became so only after white American women arrived in Haiti in 1916.⁹ From this point on, all contact between U.S. citizens and Haitians was virtually terminated; hotels, restaurants, and clubs catering to U.S. became segregated and off limits to Haitians. This policy extended even to the very white-skinned, and wealthy mulattoes. The U.S. made no distinction between mulatto and his black peasant countrymen.

That these racial attitudes were shared even by the most senior officer in Haiti is suggested by the comments attributed to Colonel Littleton W. T. Waller

These people are niggers in spite of the thin varnish of education and refinement. Down in their hearts they are just the same happy, idle irresponsible people we know of.¹⁰

Brigade Commander Cole in 1917 made the same sort of comment regarding the educated mulattoes:

The Negroes of mixed type (mulattoes), who constitute the majority of the educated people and politicians, have the general characteristics of such people the world over - vain, loving praise, excitable, changeable,

⁹. Rotberg, Squalor of Politics, p. 138.

¹⁰. quoted in Schmidt, U.S. Occupation, p. 79.

beyond belief illogical, and double faced. Many of them are highly educated and polished, but their sincerity must always be doubted."¹¹

These notions of racial inferiority were held by the Americans even in the later 20's and not only in the early years of the occupation. High Commissioner Russel commented in 1929 that: "The Haitian mentality only recognized force, and appeal to reason and logic is unthinkable."¹²

The social historian James G. Leyburn accused the United States of deliberately sending marines from the southern states to Haiti in the early days of the occupation "on the theory that they would, from long acquaintance with Negroes, know how to 'handle' them."¹³ Schmidt has argued against Leyburn's accusation but does admit that "Southerners and Southern racial codes were conspicuous."¹⁴ Offended mulattoes retaliated with expressions of their own cultural racism. They made fun of the uncultured and boorish American who could not speak French and who seemed to always drink alcohol to excess.

The Chief American Administrators, Waller and Butler, strained even further the cultural relations between the educated mulattoes and themselves by their open disdain for the concept of elitism that was basic to the social and economic position of the mulattoes in Haiti. U.S. concepts such as democratic egalitarianism tended paradoxically to draw a sharp distinction between the masses of Haitian peasants and

11. Cole to H.S. Knopp, RADM, USN, Military Governor of Santa Domingo, May 17, 1917; Senate Hearings, 1922, pp. 177-185. as quoted in Schmidt, U.S. Occupation, p. 146.

12. SD 838 00/2881, Grumman to Stinson, August 29, 1930, as quoted in Schmidt, U.S. Occupation, p. 146.

13. Leyburn, The Haitian People, p. 103.

14. Schmidt, U.S. Occupation, p. 145.

the elite. The Americans loathed the aristocratic ostentatiousness of the elite, while expressing affection for the uneducated. These preferential values had a considerable impact on the type of educational and economic program instigated by the occupational government. Programs were planned to favor the peasants and to weaken the privileged position of the elite.¹⁵ In fact, the U.S. deliberately set themselves to create a middle class.¹⁶ There was an apparent contradiction in their policies, however, in that the U.S. used the well-educated mulattoes as client-presidents, so that for the first time since 1843, the mulattoes again controlled the presidency. The mulatto domination was to continue until the advent of the new black middle class in 1946.

The marines' re-establishment and enforcement of a nineteenth century law which compelled the peasants to work for three or four days per year on the roads in their immediate area, transformed the polite tête-à-tête between peasants and the U.S. into a bloody guerilla war. It is true that this conflict involved only the peasants and the U.S.; but the atrocities committed on behalf of this forced work system by U.S. military tacticians resulted in the emergence of a strong Haitian Nationalist Movement whose main uniting force was the desire to drive U.S. troops from Haitian soil. The American atrocities had included not only impressment of peasants into the service of the state, but expulsion from their houses in the middle of the night by the marines, who transported large numbers far from their own areas to work for months on the roads before being released.¹⁷ The marine methods depended

15. Ibid., p. 147.

16. A.C. Millsprague, Haiti Under American Control 1915-1930 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1931), p. 163.

17. New York Times, Oct. 15, 1920, p. 117 "Ruthless Enforcement of Ancient Corvee System Increased Banditry - Atrocities not the Rule."

upon brutality and extended to roping together the constantly guarded labourers in a manner recalling legends of French colonial slave gangs.¹⁸ This policy increased tension among the inherently independent land-holding peasantry, until violence was the only possible release. The U.S. occupation reacted to the intermittent outbreaks by issuing an order rescinding the law. However, the order was disobeyed by local marine commanders, and the practice of forced labor continued¹⁹ until finally, in 1919, the caco leader Charlmagne Peralte led some 40,000 followers in a massive uprising against the Occupation. His aim was to push the U.S. off the island; but because the marines had successfully disarmed nearly all of the Cacos in 1915, the fight was an uneven one. Marines armed with modern rifles and war planes struck back at Peralte's armory of machetes, knives, picks, a few pistols, and two or three hundred rifles.²⁰ The marines used hunt and kill tactics to root out the guerillas, and there was a striking imbalance between Haitian and marine casualties; during the first five years of the occupation (3,500 Haitians died, as compared with 14 to 16 marines).²¹ The insurrection was quickly halted in 1919 after the marines successfully assassinated the peasant leader Peralte. In 1921, a U.S. Senate investigation was held in answer to

18. Rotberg, Politics of Squalor, p. 121.

19. New York Times, Oct. 27, 1921, p. 40. "Forced Work on Roads" as reported to Senate committee by Colonel Hooker.

20. Schmidt, U.S. Occupation, p. 102.

21. Ibid., p. 103fn.

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newspaper allegations and Haitian protests that prisoners had been massacred by marine soldiers and that American planes had strafed and bombed Haitian villages.²² This investigation eventually resulted in the withdrawing of U.S. occupation forces.

An urban based nationalist movement began to manifest itself in Haiti during the guerrilla campaign. The failure of the guerrillas was followed by a vigorous opposition by the mulatto elite on whom the occupation had had a monumental effect. These "foreign materialists" had shattered Haiti's image of its special position in the world as the first free black nation and as the second independent nation in the western hemisphere. The mulattoes' socio-cultural values were destroyed along with their country's prestige among foreign nations. A state of spiritual and intellectual crisis arose from the U.S. humiliation and suppression.

Mulatto intellectuals who had originally supported the U.S. Occupation, like Jean Price-Mars²³ and Arthur Holly²⁴ were shocked into the need for a realistic re-appraisal of the nation's cultural history. For the French way, the French institutions, and the French culture had failed the Haitians. Several years of chaos had culminated in loss of sovereignty, in misery and despondency. Haitians had been wrong to emulate European culture rather than the African. For Price-Mars, Holly and other intellectuals, imitation of the European model had resulted in loss or denial of responsibilities to the "rural masses" who were transformed "into a parasitic,

22. New York Times, Oct. 27, 1921, p. 40.

23. Jean Price-Mars, La Vocation de l'elite (Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie Edmond Cheret, 1919) and Jean Price-Mars, Ainsi parla l'oncle: Essais d'Ethnographie (Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie de Compiegne, 1928).

24. Arthur Holly, Rapport entre l'institution, la psychologie, et l'etat social (Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie Edmond Cheret, 1921).

superficial and prejudiced clique."²⁵ Price-Mars and Holly reacted by rejecting their French heritage and turning instead to the traditions of the people who, scorned and neglected for over a century, had retained many features of their African folk culture.²⁶ The writings of these men began a literary and political debate which was to rage through the 1930's and 40's, centering on such themes as" (1) the peasant's economic and political struggle for survival, (2) the failure of the mulattoes' institutions and culture, (3) the question of a biological foundation for racial differences. "François Duvalier and Lorimer Denis later adopted the position of Price-Mars and Holly in order to argue against the dogma of such eminent mulattoes as Antenor Firmin²⁷ and Hannibal Price.²⁸

Firmin and Price had maintained that although Haitians were black and African by blood, the Haitian mentalité was French. Thus they stressed the French European and not the African influence as a model for Haitian development. They tried to demonstrate that innate differences between the races did not exist; that, in fact, people of all races are fundamentally equal. Firmin pointed to the great achievements of the ancient Egyptians, who he supposed to be of black Ethiopian origin. He went on to refute efforts by European anthropologists to prove that the

25. David Nicholls, "Biology and Politics in Haiti," Race, VIII (October, 1971), p. 205.

26. G.R. Coulthard, Race and Colour in Caribbean Literature (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 64.

27. Antenor Firmin, De l'égalité des races humaines (Paris: Pichon, 1885).

28. Hannibal Price, De la Réhabilitation de la race noire par la République d'Haiti (Port-au-Prince: J. Verrollat, 1900).

ancient Egyptians were white, efforts whose motivation according to Firmin stemmed from their racial prejudices.²⁹ Price-Mars maintained that the theory of racial inferiority was a carry-over from the slave-oriented society.³⁰ In opposition to the inferiority theory, he proposed that of a great and highly civilized African past. His aim was not to deny the importance of European civilization but to argue "that black people were fundamentally the same as Europeans and the differences between the races are only superficial,"³¹ As Firmin wrote: "Men are everywhere endowed with the same qualities and with the same faults, without distinction of colour or of anatomic form."³²

Holly was the first to argue against the long-standing mulatto tradition. He rejected European values and institutions while promoting voodoo and other African traditions. He argued that African culture was an inevitable manifestation of Haiti since the majority of the Haitian people belonged to the negro race, and he stressed the opinion that "each race has its particular genius which is reflected in its psychological attitudes."³³ He emphasized the necessity of protecting those traditions, maintaining that this could be accomplished only if Haitian leaders and not European priests controlled the educational system in Haiti. He believed that the voodoo cult should be accepted as a valid national institution because it was a true reflection of the cultural and religious life of the black people.

29. Firmin, De l'égalité des races humaines, p. 337.

30. Price-Mars, Ainsi parla l'oncle, p. 108.

31. Nicholls, "Biology", p. 205.

32. Firmin, De l'égalité des races humaines, p. 662.

33. Holly, L'instruction, la psychologie et l'état social, p. 19.

Jean Price-Mars, even more than Holly, worked to arouse the new generation from its cultural sleep. His definitive ethnological work, Ainsi Parla l'Oncle, published in 1928 (thirteen years after the U.S. occupation had begun), constituted in itself a veritable manifesto for the cultural and political revolution to follow. This writing stimulated, and continues to stimulate, its readers to adhere to cultural and political integrity. Price-Mars' aim in writing the book was to urge the elite to abandon false French-Európean values and to accept their African background, preserved for them in the Haitian black folk-culture. He began this task by an investigation and romanticization of Haitian folklore, religion and even language; eventually he believed that he had succeeded in tracing Haitian origins to advanced civilizations in Africa in order to demonstrate to the mulattoes that blacks had a history of their own. His work appeared simultaneously with the founding of a new wave of literary journals and protest movements.

Le Revue Indigene, founded in 1927 by Jacques Roumain and other poets and novelists,³⁴ was formed to encourage the study of Haiti's dominant black heritage and forgotten peasant majority. The editorial aim was to end flat, servile literary imitations and to seek a truly autonomous Haitian prose style.³⁵

The early trend in this search for a Haitian poetry and literature,

³⁴. The editors were Normil Sylvain, Carl Brouard, Philippe Thorby Marcelin, Emile Rouman, Antoine Viewe.

³⁵. Edith Efran, "The New Movement in Haiti," Caribbean Quarterly, IV (January, 1955), p. 20.

decried the imitation of French verse found in so many Haitian lyrics. Valmy-Boyse remarked that

The old world sky hovers over the poetry, and often through the imagery with which it is bedecked, we see arise not a West Indian landscape, but a village on the shore of the Loire.³⁶

Hence, the choice of topics by poets and novelists before the occupation reflected the colonial heritage of the group and perhaps a feeling of racial inferiority. For as A. C. Hardouin remarks, "if for the European the second half of the nineteenth century was marked by expansion, glory, and industrialization, for the peuples des couleur it was the era of Gobineau."³⁷ Arthur de Gobineau, sometimes called the "father of racist ideology",³⁸ wrote of Haitians in 1853 that "their manners are as depraved, brutal and savage as in Dahomey or among the Fellatahs."³⁹ Gobineau believed that whatever the origin of the human race, "it is certain that the different families are today absolutely separate."⁴⁰ The black race is at the "foot of the ladder,"⁴¹ and is "incapable of civilization".⁴² Thus perhaps the impact of the colonial heritage (the elite going to France for their education) and the writings of Gobineau were influential in the choice of topics and styles by

^{36.} J. Valmy-Boyse, Conference sur la poesie francaise chez les noirs d'Haiti (Paris: Pichon, 1903), p. 41.

^{37.} A. C. Hardouin, "Haiti: A Study in Regression," Mexico Quarterly Vol. II (May, 1963), p. 78.

^{38.} Michael Biddiss, Father of Racist Ideology (London: Wiederman and Nicholson, 1970).

^{39.} Arthur de Gobineau, The Inequality of Human Races, trans. by Adrian Collins (London: Heineman, 1915), p. 41.

^{40.} Ibid., p. 133.

^{41.} Ibid., p. 205.

^{42.} Ibid., p. 212.

Haitian poets and novelists.

When the elite rejected the peasants and their folklore as topics worthy of discussion, they did so in part to defend their country from unfair and at times vicious attacks from abroad. In his malicious two-volume work ⁴³ published in 1884, the retired British diplomat Sir Spencer St. John used the 1864 Affaire de Bization as a climax to his history of Haiti. The Bization incident involved the atypical and unusual sacrifice of a child by a demented group of peasant men and women. These people were quickly brought to trial, proven guilty, and executed. It seems that Sir Spencer researched this and other events, accepting a good deal of hearsay. Leyburn charges him with having collected such material uncritically,

to prove that voodoo (Voodooism he called it) was the real religion of the Haitians (which it was), and that it was compounded of the vilest superstitions and most fiendish practices, of which the most essential was human sacrifice of "the goat without horns" followed by a cannibalistic communion.⁴⁴

W.B. Seabrook was another author who wrote deliberately defamatory works, using such phrases as "blood-maddened", "sex-maddened", "god-maddened" to describe the mental state of the people participating in a voodoo ceremony.⁴⁵ Sensationalism of this kind no doubt discouraged the sensitive mulattoes from using folk religion as a literary theme, in some cases to such an extent that they denied its importance or even its

⁴³. Sir Spencer St. John, Hayti, or the Black Republic (London: Scribner and Welford, 1884).

⁴⁴. Leyburn, The Haitian People, p. 132, emphasis in the original.

⁴⁵. W.B. Seabrook, The Magic Island (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1929), p. 42.

very existence. Mulatto allegiance to the Catholic Church, and deference to white European culture, also influenced their decision to decry so-called "barbaric" practices. In any event, the critical reversal of this tendency in the ethnographic works of Holly, Price-Marş, and others had a major impact upon the literary minds of the Republic. Haitian poets and novelists discovered the peasant and his Africanized institutions, which suddenly became fitting and exciting literary themes. The peasant and his struggle against drought and eroded land were the subject of Jacques Roumain in his best known novel, Gouverneurs de la Rosée (Masters of the Dew).⁴⁶ This work, which has been translated into several languages including Creole, deals with the peasant's constant struggle for survival in a drought-stricken and impoverished land. The hero, named Manuel, returns home after cutting cane in Cuba for fifteen years. Being now a "man of the world" Manuel does not believe in the voodoo ceremonies nor in the supernatural causes which are said to prolong the feuds between families in his home-village. Manuel discovers water and puts an end to the village feuds; but when he is eventually killed his burial is accompanied by a voodoo ceremony.

A careful study of Haitian folklore and voodoo ceremonies, by Pierre and Phillippe Thorby-Marcelin is evident in their novels dealing with peasant and provincial-rural life. Their award winning novel Canape Vert, which was translated into English by Edmund Wilson under the title All Men are Mad,⁴⁷ focuses on the provincial elite and

⁴⁶. Jacques Roumain, Gouverneurs de la Rosée (Masters of the Dew) trans. by Langston Hughes and Mercer Cook (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1947).

⁴⁷. Phillippe Thorby-Marcelin and Pierre Marcelin, Canape Vert (All Men are Mad) (New York: Farrar Strauss and Giroux, 1970), trans. by Edmund Wilson.

ridicules their promiscuous behaviour. The novel is set in the year of the anti-superstition campaign (1941) conducted by the Roman Catholic Church, with the knowledge and aid of the Haitian government. The Church attempted to confront the voodoo religion by burning its alters, sacred trees, drums and other objects. Despite their knowledge of peasant folkways the work of the Marcelin brothers, perhaps because of their mulatto elitist background, is notable for its lack of political or social committment.

Jacques Stéphen Aléxis takes a very clear social position in his novels. His characters also exist in historically realistic settings and are in constant confrontation with the government. His novel, Les Arbres musiciens,⁴⁸ focuses on peasant life during the anti-superstition campaign and the S.H.A.D.A. land transaction (1941-42). The American owned S.H.A.D.A. Company had purchased land from the mulatto-controlled government for the construction of a great rubber plantation that would help the country economically. The land had been occupied for over one hundred years by peasant squatters, who refused to leave their land to make way for "progress". One scene in the novel involves a conversation between the American Ambassador and the Archbishop of Port-au-Prince, where the two officials decide to collaborate in ousting the peasants from the land and bulldozing the voodoo ceremonial objects.

Jacques Stéphen Aléxis' novel Compère Général Soleil,⁴⁹ portrays the never-ending struggle of the urban poor for survival. His characters

⁴⁸. Jacques Stéphen Aléxis, Les Arbres musiciens (Paris: Gallimand, 1957).

⁴⁹. Jacques Stéphen Aléxis, Compère Général Soleil (Paris: Gallimand, 1955).

are concerned entirely with earning enough money to eat. The arrival of each ship could mean a chance to earn a small sum as a longshoreman, or to dive for small change in the case of a passenger liner. His characters see a way to lighten their misery through the establishment of unions. But these are crushed by the businesses with the cooperation of government forces. We also see the adversity of the black lawyer who is forced to drive a truck for a living because he cannot compete with the mulatto elite for clients. At the novel's end the hero and his wife flee from the cane fields of the Dominican Republic with the troops of Trujillo in pursuit. This period (1937) marks the Trujillo program of slaughtering all Haitian cane cutters in the Dominican Republic.

This brief review of literary themes has not done justice to all novelists nor even attempted to cover the many Haitian poets and their works.⁵⁰ However, the reader will note the shift in literary theme from French romanticism to Haitian social comment. It will also be clear that African folklore and voodoo were no longer tabu subjects, but had become the object of serious ethnological studies. Intellectuals were at last openly emphasizing the Republic's debt to Africa and the influence of its customs and beliefs upon the life of Haiti.

These literary and ethnological writings had a reinforcing effect on the political protest movements, whose main unifying theme was still the desire to end the occupation. However, there emerged a definite split in the nationalist movement after 1934. Ideology was

⁵⁰. The reader is referred to G.R. Couthard's Race and Colour in Caribbean Literature (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), for a review of the new trend in Haitian poetry.

at the basis of the schism. In 1929, a group known as the Trois D's began to meet. Its leaders were Louis Diaquoi, Lorimer Denis, and François Duvalier. The crucial difference between these men and the intellectuals of the literary movement was the non-elite background of the former.⁵¹ They were part of the embryonic but emerging middle class, and they continued to explore the folklore symbolism associated with voodoo and its significance for all of Haiti. The group was reorganized by Diaquoi in 1932 with Denis and Duvalier as founding members; it also attracted the two poets Carl Brouard and Clement Magloire and the socio-political critics Kléber Georges-Jacob and Arthur Bonhomme. The movement called itself Les Griots.⁵² In their learned journal, La Revue Scientifique et Litteraire d'Haiti, they began an investigation into the social, psychological, and cultural peculiarities of Haitians, examining first the African Civilization. Duvalier's article "L'Essentielle de la Doctrine des Griots" best describes the essential points of the "Griots doctrine" and of the group's methodology. He writes:

Since the dogma of racial inferiority is attached to one of the composite ethnic groups of Haiti (the blacks), we have examined history, anthropology, ethnography to place the facts of the problem on a scientific base The historical study of the colonial milieu has permitted us to study the evolution of the African element in its new human and physical environment.... We must take a bio-psychological approach in order to develop a national doctrine which would speed up the fusion necessary to develop the Haitian genius.⁵³

51. David Nicholls, "Ideology and Political Protest in Haiti, 1930-46," Journal of Contemporary History, 9, No. 4. (February, 1974), p. 5.

52. The group took its name from a traditional African institution. The Griot is the poet, the Storyteller, the Magician of the Tribe, who perpetuates tribal customs and beliefs. Ibid., p. 5.

53. François Duvalier, Oeuvres essentielles: I Eléments d'une doctrine (Port-au-Prince: Presses Nationales d'Haiti, 1968), p. 40. My translation.

Their position, then, was similar to the négritude ideology being developed in Paris in the 1930's by the interaction of French-speaking African and West Indian students. It can probably be argued that these Haitians looked upon the U.S. Occupation as constituting a colonial episode similar to that experienced by Africans. Hence the Griots movement is somewhat comparable to the négritude protest so far as there existed the same emphasis on Africa, the same rejection of European values and the same belief in the existence of a specifically African psychology, which interprets the world in a way different from the European. The Griot is characteristically distinct from négritude, however, in that it takes an anti-mulatto position and accepts a black interpretation of history as outlined by Duvalier and Denis. Furthermore, there is a greater importance placed upon the biological foundation of racial differentiation. These differences have led one author to brand the Griot movement as noirisme.⁵⁴ A more complete analysis of the noiriste philosophy, as exemplified in François Duvalier's writings, will be made in the next chapter.

There developed a conflict between the "bourgeois" cultural nationalists and the noiristes. The issue was that discussed in Chapter Two; the nationalists opposed Africanism on the basis that it destroyed national unity by emphasizing race above nation.⁵⁵ The nationalists concurred with the noiristes' call to end cultural parasitism, and with

54. L. Kesteloot, Les écrivains noirs de langue française: naissance d'une littérature, as quoted in Nicholls, "Ideology and Political Protest," p. 5.

55. Ibid., p. 9.

the noiriste reliance on the peasant and his folklore for literary inspiration. But the nationalists vehemently opposed the noiriste political ideology which placed responsibility for the 1915 Occupation upon the deep color divisions within Haitian society. The noiristes,⁵⁶ consequently, that the power be removed from the mulatto elite and placed in the hands of an authentic black leader having the support of the masses. In contrast, the nationalists denied the conclusion that all Haiti's problems centered on the importance of the color question in the history of the Republic, and maintained, as they had long done, that political power should be in the hands of the most knowledgeable section of the nation - which meant mulatto hands. This ideological struggle became the leading issue following the 1929 student strikes which marked the end of the Occupation and the return of corrupt mulatto rule.

The cultural nationalists, or "the young Turks, scions of wealthy bourgeois families, educated abroad and untried with Marxist theories."⁵⁶ organized the political strikes which brought about the collapse of the occupation. Termination of the Occupation also ended the superficial ideological unity of the traditionally disparate Haitian groups. While most of the nationalists "succumbed to the lure of the plush jobs"⁵⁷ in the corrupt and authoritarian mulatto government of Sténio Vincent (1930-1941), the noiristes, "to whom the democratizing effect of the American Occupation upon education had given freer access to higher learning and the liberal professions",⁵⁸ continued studying, discussing

56. Courlander and Bastien, Religion and Politics in Haiti, p. 54.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

and writing about folk tradition. It was not until 1941-42 that the joint campaign of the Church and the mulatto-controlled government against voodoo brought the Noiriste and the Bourgeois Nationalist Ideologies to an open clash.

The occupation continued without any violent incidents in the 1920's. The Americans continued their pragmatic program with its emphasis on such materialistic projects as roads, bridges, airports, irrigation projects, wharves, schools, and hospitals. The political and economic decision-making process remained under U.S. control with the use of client-presidents and educated mulatto civil servants. There was absolutely no effort made to broaden the political base to give Haitians positions of responsibility. The student strikes demonstrated the young Haitians' disapproval of government plans to limit the number of scholarships, and acted as the catalyst to long suppressed Haitian frustrations. The strike quickly spread to other sectors of the society. The U.S. State Department, at the time pursuing the Good Neighbor Policy, acted favorably to the demands of the strikers and quickly made plans to end the occupation and turn the government over to the Haitians. The mulatto Sténio Vincent (1930-1941), the client-president at the time of the strikes, took office officially from the U.S. in 1934. A retrenchment of the privileged elite followed, and Vincent made no attempt to broaden the power structure. Rotberg writes that "the political base was, if anything narrowed. Sectional and class distinctions were more rigid, and the importance of color was re-emphasized."⁵⁹

⁵⁹. Rotberg, Politics of Squalor, p. 167.

In 1935, Vincent used the referendum to acquire consent for the transfer of authority over all economic matters from the legislature to the executive. He followed this by the removal of eleven senators, including his 1934 opponent Jean Price-Mars. Then he personally tailored the constitution so that "the president became the 'personification of the nation' with powers to dissolve the legislature at will, to reorganize the ranks of the judiciary, to appoint ten of the twenty-two senators (and to suggest the other eleven names to the Chamber of Deputies),"⁶⁰ The judiciary and the legislature were to act in a servant capacity to the executive and not as a check on its powers. The president was also permitted to pass legally-binding decrees during the Assembly's recess. The Constitution also extended Vincent's mandate (due to expire in 1936) by a further five years. He justified these actions by referring to his paramount role in liberating Haiti from the U.S. Rodman comments: "Vincent, calling himself Haiti's 'second liberator', benefited and the elite caste seemed firmly in the saddle for the foreseeable future."⁶¹ Vincent used censorship, arbitrary arrest, and indefinite detention without trial to enforce his rule. Vincent's narrow and exclusive rule reinforced the views of Duvalier and other Griots that the ruling mulattoes were parasitic and self-interested. Vincent was aware of the Griot position, and he expressed his contempt for their intellectual writings:

Their headquarters was in Paris. But which of them would have dreamed of travelling around the Soudan or the Congo to come into close contact with the soul of our ancient ancestors, the Mandingos or the Banilus? Do you know of

⁶⁰. Ibid., p. 154.

⁶¹. Rodman, The Black Republic; p.26.

a single one who has made this pilgrimage? I don't. What I do know is that they prefer the Boulevard des Italiens to the swamps of Bahr-el Gazek or the mountains of Kilimanjaro.⁶²

Vincent, like many of the elite mulatto class, did not take the movement seriously; they saw it merely as the intellectual pastime of an unrealistic group who seemed to want all Haitians to return to Africa. Vincent reluctantly left office in 1941 under U.S. diplomatic pressure. The U.S. refusal to sanction Vincent for a third term made way for the president's hand-picked mulatto successor, Elie Lescot (1941-46).

Lescot continued the pattern of rule reintroduced by his predecessor Vincent. He disregarded democratic processes and, with other mulattoes in high positions, exploited the presidential office for personal financial gain.⁶³ The governmental policies concerning voodoo and the peasants' land brought an end to mulatto rule (except for the brief six-year tenure, 1950-56, of self styled caudillo Colonel P. Magloire and the ultimate victory of black power. The background of these two events must be considered in the light of the emergence of a new black middle class, which won a decisive political victory in 1946 when the educated black Dumarsais Estimé assumed power.

The Catholic church which was dominated by foreigners conducted the campaign against voodoo with support from the state in 1941-42. It was the first time in Haitian history that an Haitian president had given

62. Sténio Vincent, En Posant les Jahans (Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie de Compiegne, 1939), pp. 153-4, as quoted in G.R. Coulthard, "Research Commentary: Négritude - Reality and Mystification," Caribbean Studies, X, No. 1 (February, 1955), p. 44.

63. Rotberg, Politics of Squalor, pp. 168-169.

complete cooperation to Catholicism against voodoo. President Lescot stated:

We, Elie Lescot, President of the Republic, personally recommend to the protection of the civil and military authorities of the Republic, the Revd. Father Carl Edward Peters, Missionary of the Company of Mary, and we entirely approve the mission which the Revd Father Peters has undertaken to combat fetishism and superstition...⁶⁴

The clergy's methods involved the confiscation of ritual paraphernalia, the destruction of cult centers, subjection of the cult leaders to intimidation and ridicule, and the forced renunciation of their faith by voodoo believers.⁶⁵ Nationalist writers joined with the Griot group, Roumain, and the ethnologists to vehemently attack this outrage against the folkculture. For the black intellectuals, the church's attack on voodoo was an attempt by a foreign-dominated body⁶⁶ to eradicate a tradition which bound the Haitian masses. The blacks believed that the clergy and mulatto elite had engineered the joint venture "to undermine the African elements of Haitian culture, replacing them by Gallo-Latin traditions."⁶⁷ The foreign clergy had been attempting to import French tradition since the signing of the Concordat in 1860, and they had had at least one effective tool for the purpose, in their control of the educational system.⁶⁸

64. C.E. Peters, Lumiere sur le humfont (Port-au-Prince, 1941), p. 4, as quoted in David Nicholls, "Ideology and Political Protest", p. 12.

65. Courlander and Bastien, Religion and Politics in Haiti, pp. 64-65.

66. By 1924, sixty-four years after the signing of the Concordat, there were only five Haitian priests working in the Republic, out of a total of nearly two hundred priests. By 1957, still less than one-quarter of the priests working in Haiti were nationals, and all five diocesan bishops were foreigners (Major Rémy Augustin, a Haitian was an auxilliary bishop), David Nicholls, "Politics and Religion in Haiti," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 3(September, 1970), p. 403.

67. Ibid., p. 405.

68. Duvalier and Denis, "Ensignment de l'Histoire", pp. 103-119 in Oeuvres essentielles, Vol. I.

Bastien maintains that in earlier years the French churchmen were, in fact, assigned the secret mission of "creating a climate of opinion favorable to a voluntary association of Haiti with France."⁶⁹ The tactic used to achieve this political goal was to concentrate on the education of the upper class, to indoctrinate Haitian students with "the grandeur of France" and to expose them "to insinuations about the backwardness of their country and its incapacity for self-rule."⁷⁰ The scheme was discontinued some time in the 1890's; yet the foreign clergy, conservative in character⁷¹, continued an informal relationship with the elite whose traditions tended to set it apart from the black peasantry. The clergy even maintained the elitist point of view on the "folklorique" movement and more than one priest spoke publically against its African emphasis. Duvalier once criticized such a sermon; saying of the clergy that "not being content to delay the moral unification of the nation by poor-quality instruction, not content to attack our principal cultural institutions, our traditions, they still extoll the maintenance of our rural masses in their state of ignorance."⁷²

The anti-superstition campaign was interpreted by the black intellectuals as another colonial war. Nicholls quotes Roumain and Petit:

if the American is the adversary of our material independence,"cried Jacques Roumain and Georges Petit, "the white French clergy is the adversary of our spiritual independence, and one of the means of bringing us under the colonial yoke." The Republic of Haiti has known

69. Courlander and Bastien, Religion and Politics in Haiti, p. 45.

70. Ibid.

71. Most of the clergy were from Breton, a very conservative province in France.

72. L'avenir du pays et l'action Nefaste de M. Fosset" (1948), pp. 407-408 as quoted in Rotberg, Politics of Squalor, p. 166.

three wars, declared Gerard Goyot: the war against the French colonialists, the war against the Americans ("les colons en kaki"), and finally the war⁷³ against "les colons breton ou colons en soutanes".

The issue became more explosive by virtue of the fact that it coincided approximately with the S.H.A.D.A-U.S. controlled land speculation.

President Lescot accepted the U.S. offer to develop rubber production for the Haitian government, which expropriated 200,000 acres for S.H.A.D.A. by brutally expelling peasant squatters from land which they had cultivated in the past and from which they gained their entire livelihood.⁷⁴ Fruit trees and cultivated plots were destroyed to make way for the wild shrub which was reputed (incorrectly, it turned out) to give latex. This coincidence of events forced the Government to end the extreme anti-voodoo activities of the clergy. Shots fired in the Catholic chapel of Delmas during celebration of Sunday mass in February 1942 dramatically terminated the campaign. It was suggested earlier that the anti-voodoo campaign occurred at a point when the social structure of the country was rapidly changing. With this fact in mind, the Campaign must be understood as a desperate attempt by the Francophile mulatto elite to preserve its hegemony in the cultural field, under the threat of an expanding working class and a peasant movement mobilized by black middle class intellectuals like Duvalier. The failure of the campaign demonstrated the potential power of the opposition, and was an

73. Nicholls, "Religion and Politics in Haiti," p. 403.

74. Gingras, Caribbean Cyclone, p. 75.

indication of the imminent bourgeois nationalist defeat in 1946 at the hands of the new black middle class.

There has been much debate concerning the precise point at which this new middle class emerged from an embryonic state into a recognizable social stratum. James G. Leyburn dismissed the middle class as a possible power-contender, allowing it just one paragraph in his social history: "for the present and the near future it is safe to say there will be no more black non-elite presidents."⁷⁵ Two U.S. sociologists, John Lobb and George E. Simpson, concurred with Leyburn's assumption. Lobb did admit that a middle class would eventually emerge "with the broadening of educational opportunities", for "it may be anticipated that the cultural barrier will be lowered, and from the merging of the Elite 'fringe' and the upper stratum Noirs there will develop the necessary middle class."⁷⁶ Simpson's social analysis is somewhat more trenchant than Leyburn's or Lobb's since he at least acknowledges the existence of a middle class. However, he dismisses this social stratum as a "diminutive middle . . . considerably smaller than the elite . . . relatively unimportant in the life of the nation."⁷⁷ Price-Mars' criticism of Leyburn, that he failed to recognize this new class, La Génération de 1943, may also be applied to Lobb and Simpson: "it is incontestible that

⁷⁵. Leyburn, The Haitian People, p. 101.

⁷⁶. John Lobb, "Caste and Class in Haiti," American Journal of Sociology, 46 (July, 1940), p. 30, emphasis in the original.

⁷⁷. George E. Simpson, "Haiti's Social Structure," American Sociological Review, 6 (October, 1941), p. 642.

this class exists in respectable numbers."⁷⁸ While the middle class may have been unrecognizable to most U.S. writers, it did in fact exist, and was recognized by the more perceptive social commentators.

As examples, Roland Wingfield and Werner J. Parenton⁷⁹ have made some insightful observations on the characteristics and attitudes which set this class apart from the mulatto elite and the peasant masses. Reviewing these distinctions will help us to understand the character of Duvalier and other intellectuals, as well as their motives for seeking power.

The new black middle class, unlike the well-established mulatto, lacked traditions and values which would unite its members. Their possession of an education, mastery of French, non-manual occupation and moderate income allowing a style of life above that of the masses, all suggest that the class had more in common with the upper elite than with the masses. Yet the realization that "many of this upper echelon are 'light-skinned' and can trace their heritage back to the Affranchis in the colonial era sharply sets the two classes apart."⁸⁰ These two differences tended to influence the black class deeply for it was as a group socially insecure, self-conscious, sensitive and suspicious. It also exhibited a latent inferiority complex in face of the mulatto bourgeoisie, resenting them and accusing them of a color

78. J. Price-Mars, De la prehistoire d'Afrique a l'histoire d'Haiti (Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie de Compiegne, 1962), p. 210, as quoted in David Nicholls, "Ideology and Political Protest," p.25.

79. Roland Wingfield and Vernon J. Parenton, "Class Structure and Class Conflict in Haitian Society," Social Forces, 52, (March, 1965), pp.338-47.

80. Duvalier and Denis, Probleme des Classes, p. 96.

discrimination which the middle class saw as the sole factor preventing it from enjoying elite status. For the black middle class, then, family prestige and color came to play a secondary role, while the securing of material wealth, in order to acquire status was of paramount concern. Since the government had traditionally acted as the largest employer, politics became more important for this black class in the 1940's and the Noiriste writings more significant insofar as they formed an ideological basis on which the middle class might formulate a picture of the past and a design for future political and social action. It will be seen in the next chapter that Duvalier and Denis specifically outlined and justified the need for an "authentic black" leader who would exercise control over the Republic in league with the black intellectuals for the welfare of the masses. President D. Estimé became that leader in 1946, and Duvalier in 1957. The movement's supporters were black, educated, anti-mulatto, and very nationalistic.

CHAPTER IV

Duvalier viewed the mulatto rejection of African values for Gallo-Latin ones as a tragedy. He set out his writings "to justify and create a 'philosophy of the Haitian man'," to "modify Haitian character" so that it would reflect a true "collective psýche". He believed that his analysis was accurate since he "placed the facts of the problem on a scientific base."¹

The term "science" as used here seems to largely reflect the theories of Comte and Durkheim. Auguste Comte had argued that "the science of society was the necessary basis for the realistic art of politics."² Academics of the first two decades of the twentieth century maintained and elaborated Comte's view that man "must recognize his own responsibility for the re-making of his own society and for his own destiny."³ Emile Durkheim was a follower of Comte who agreed that a social system was in "equilibrium" or "dis-equilibrium" depending upon its adaptation to its environment. Durkheim emphasized the search for the culture's "social facts" as a prerequisite to fulfilling the social needs of the particular society. The "needs" referred to here were those social phenomena which bring "harmony", "functional integration", "social solidarity and equilibrium" to a social organism. A statesman's political activity should consist of maintaining "the normal state, if

1. Duvalier, Oeuvres essentielles, Vol. I, p. 40.

2. Auguste Comte, "Plan of the Scientific Operations Necessary for Reorganizing Society," May, 1822, as quoted in Ronald Fletcher, The Crisis of Industrial Civilization: The Early Essays of Auguste Comte (London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 1974), p. 133.

3. Ibid., p. 137.

it is threatened, of re-establishing it, and of rediscovering its conditions if they have changed."⁴ Durkheim described the role of a statesman as similar to that of a physician; his duties are "not to push his society toward an ideal which seems attractive to him," but rather to "prevent the outbreak of illness by good hygiene." Hence the politician, to formulate wise policy, must have detailed knowledge or comprehension of the "social facts" and their interconnection. Science was the basis for prudent prediction and guidance in his political action. This "knowledge for action" was achieved through scientific procedure and accuracy of method gained by careful observation, description, generalization, classification and comparison of the social phenomena using the methodologies of all the social sciences. Durkheim acknowledged the possible need to go outside the society to discover the model or organization for a particular institution. Thus the method in such cases is historical and comparative. For an historical account will explain how a social fact has come to be, in terms of antecedent social facts. Their emphasis on historicism suggests that these authors place heavy dependence on building a conceptual scheme through the use of an evolutionary perspective. Evolutionary studies could give valuable insight into the origins of institutions. As Ronald Fletcher wrote, the term evolution was used for the purposes of identifying the "basic bio-psychological and associational elements

4. Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, ed. by G.E.C. Catlin, trans. by S. Soloray and J. Mueller (New York: The Free Press, 1938), p. 75, emphasis added.

5. Ibid.

which were (always and everywhere) the primary causes involved in institutionalization".⁶ It was what Durkheim called "social solidarity", while Comte labelled it "consensus".⁷

This notion that each society or civilization possessed a unique character was not founded on differences of origin as Gobineau suggested but rather on differences of development. Durkheim in his social writings stressed the creativity of group or social psychic forces. He gave special consideration to socio-psychological processes and their importance in an associational science of society (social psychology).⁸ For the associational processes are psychologically creative and engender collective elements of human experience and behaviour which go into the very creation of individuals and which cannot be said to have existed in individual minds before the association took place. Possibly Durkheim carried his notion of collective representations too far by insisting that they are quite independent of the individual (i.e. cause and effect interdependencies). In brief, it was one of Durkheim's rules for tracing the culture's historical "facts" that one searched "in the internal constitution of the social group"⁹ for the beginnings of any crucial social processes. Durkheim believed that identifying these social "facts" and discovering their functional significance to the society would produce causal laws pertaining to the society.¹⁰

6. Ronald Fletcher, The Making of Sociology: A Study of Sociological Theory, Vol. II (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1971), p. 795, emphasis added.

7. Talcott Parsons, "Emile Durkheim", International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 4, pp. 311-319.

8. Fletcher, Sociology, p. 377.

9. Durkheim, Rules, p. 113.

10. Morris Ginsberg, "The Outlook of Sociology at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century" in his book Evolution and Progress, Vol. III (Toronto: William Heinemann Ltd., 1961), p. 187.

These laws would command the same respect as do laws in the natural sciences.

The theories of Comte and Durkheim will give the reader a greater appreciation of Duvalier's "scientific" analysis; his methodology and assumptions are without doubt influenced by these two sociologists. Three others, to be noted later in the discussion, had a particularly important impact on Duvalier's thoughts - Leo Frobenius, Georges Montandon and Alexandre Baschmakoff.

In his introduction to Oeuvres essentielles, Duvalier attempted to forestall the criticism that his method was "anti-scientific". For Duvalier argued that a scientific approach meant that one searched for answers to a nation's political and social problems by examining only phenomena within or related to the culture in question. He defined culture as "a particular form of civilization".¹¹ Civilization was, in turn, defined as "a synthesis of human creations and acquisitions both on the spiritual and material plane."¹² Duvalier viewed civilization from an evolutionary perspective: "of people's stages of progress. Consequently culture will be inferior, average, and superior."¹³ Superior culture was defined in terms of "the highest level which collectivities (communities) can attain in the field of spiritual matters."¹⁴

11. Duvalier, Oeuvres essentielles, p. 71.

12. Ibid., p. 72.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

Thus Duvalier did not sustain the notion that culture was "unilateral". On the contrary he saw each society as autonomous and original since it was characterized by different traditions and customs. He wrote that "Modern humanism, while acknowledging the innate unity of human nature, should place equal emphasis upon original particularisms."¹⁵ Duvalier posited that a plurality of psychologies logically followed this acceptance of a scientific humanist position, meaning that he felt each culture had a particular psychology which developed over time. The culture should develop on its own without incorporating aspects of foreign cultures, e.g., in the Haitian case, French culture. A necessary condition for this development to take place in Haiti was the emergence of an "authentic" black leader. This concept had significant consequences for Duvalier's new Haitian man. "No longer will there be . . . one unique civilization [French] which is opposed the barbarousness and savagery of a backward population [Haitian]."¹⁶ He argued, then, that those individuals who support the former position, a unilinear approach to culture, and who judge their values as barbarous and superstitious are on the periphery of true humanism.

Duvalier insisted that the Catholic Church was one group which wrongly supported a universal or classical humanism which emphasized the seventeenth and eighteenth century Cartesian notion of reason (the synthesis of the experience of the species through time). The clerics denied such segregated factors as race, environment, and history.

¹⁵. Ibid., p. 121. (by "particularisms" Duvalier was referring to aspects of a particular culture that were unique to it and could only be altered over a long period of time.)

¹⁶. Ibid.

They sustained, instead, the notion that development of every ethnic group, and of humanity itself, passed from the stone age to the age of steam and electricity and to the atomic age of today. Further discussion of Duvalier's basis for this concept will be outlined later when Leo Frobenius is discussed.

Acceptance of this definition of scientific humanism quite logically led Duvalier to argue that it was wrong for a nation to look outside itself for a solution. He warned of the dangers in accepting general explanations that do not relate closely to the people's character (sa mentalité). "This is why as well it is just as anti-scientific to confer as we please such and such a form of government on a human group."¹⁷ The form of government must "evolve itself and is closely related to the degree of the people's character."¹⁸ He suggested that Haiti's history exemplifies what can happen when a people does not follow the spiritual ideas of the community:

Another century of instability has marked our evolution to lead to the failure of the 1915 period, in the course of which we diverged from the path of our destiny to play ... the role of a civilization not our own.¹⁹

There was a need, then, to investigate the country's history to uncover the causes for the republic's instability, a social weakness which had provoked doubt and scepticism among a large number of Haitians.

17. Ibid., p. 53.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., p. 52.

Duvalier, with his colleague Lorimer Denis, set out to prove that the nation's character (mentalité: community or group sentiment, thoughts and actions) was African and not Gallo-Latin, and to propose the adoption of African morals and traditions. His historic/ethnologic method of research²⁰ involved a comparative examination of African cultures to locate and extract supposed "survivals" in the customs of Haiti, and the fitting of these arbitrarily into "stage" sequences leading back to origins. Duvalier and Denis commented on their approach that

... it was necessary for us to make historical science the basic element of our investigations. The Haitian man has thus been placed back in his original cycles of civilization [sic] experienced by him at given times.²¹

They occupied themselves with pre-history, then,

in order to understand better the past and grasp at the same time our mental structure, our fundamental "I", all steps leading us to the development of the philosophy of the Haitian man.²²

Their analysis relied heavily on Jean Price-Mars; Ainsi parla l'oncle and Georges Hardy's Vue Générale de l'histoire de l'Afrique.²³ Duvalier and Denis sided with Price-Mars in deriding the Haitian elite's attempt to claim descendency from the Indian. "Everyone wants to believe all African slaves and their descendents were killed on the plantations or disappeared."²⁴ The authors insisted that you cannot erase the black

20. François Duvalier and Lorimer Denis, "La Civilisation haitienne: notre mentalité est-elle Africaine ou Gallo-Latin?" Revue de la Société d'Histoire et de Géographie d'Haiti, VII (May, 1936), pp. 1-31.

21. Duvalier, Oeuvres essentielles, Vol. I, pp. 52-53.

22. Ibid., p. 135.

23. Georges Hardy, Vue Générale de l'histoire de l'Afrique (Paris: A. Colin, 1948), 5 ed.

24. Duvalier and Denis, "Notre mentalité," p. 4.

race in one or two generations. Hardy's remarks are given as evidence for their position. Hardy, in his historical analysis of French colonial Africa, had criticized France's policy of educating negroes to administer the metropole's policies. He claimed that ‘

the negro educated in France does not have the ideals for the evolution of his race. Their behaviour is false modernisms and their rejection of tradition is more apparent than real and always temporary.²⁵

Hardy concluded that one can change language, dress, and habits, but that one generation cannot eradicate what centuries of brutal history have imprinted. The veneer of Europeanization, for Hardy, was simply an artificiality.²⁶ Hardy referred to the "positive and national" British colonial policy. Britain, unlike France, did not assume itself to be the "apostle of law and justice" in the world. This difference in thinking, according to Hardy, was evident from the British institutionalization of a colonial policy which took into account the African's past culture and the socio-ethnic climate. In conclusion, then, Duvalier and Denis supported Hardy's argument that the Haitians must cease their white pretence, and begin to consider seriously their African heritage.

Duvalier, in his article "Question d'Anthro-Sociologie: Le Determinisme Racial",²⁷ further elaborated the argument that the origins of cultural and social differences among the races were biologically

²⁵. Quoted in François Duvalier and Lorimer Denis, "La Civilisation de l'Afrique noire et le Problème haitien," Revue de la Société d'Histoire et de Géographie d'Haiti, VII (January-April, 1936), p. 35.

²⁶. Ibid., p. 36.

²⁷. Duvalier, Oeuvres essentielles, Vol. I, pp. 91-97.

determined. He insisted that the biology of a racial group determines its psychology, which in turn determines its "collective personality".

In his own words:

Psychologists, for their part, are categoric: biological heredity corresponds to psychological reality . . .
Psychological characteristics have been transmitted, despite the mixing of peoples, through thousands of years. Hence psychological determinism, conditioned either by heredity or history.²⁸

Thus Duvalier maintained that a genetic causality rather than an environmental one must be applied to interpretation of the differences between races.

After setting out this explanation and showing the Haitian mentalite to be African, he asked his readers,

How then can we explain the actions of a certain section of our group which, in the face of the accomplishments of science, persists in the negative attitude of believing that the Haitian people is an absolute starting point? Others influenced by letters contend, despite all logic, to be operating a process of selection in their heredity, by adopting the Gallo-Latin element.²⁹

The "certain group" referred to was undoubtedly the mulatto elite.

Duvalier reinforced his biological argument by taking wholesale sections from several social scientists who had addressed themselves to the question of racial determinism. The remarks of these writers must be reviewed so that the reader may have a better appreciation of Duvalier's intellectual background; for Duvalier did not explicitly cite their theory or its proofs, he merely incorporated their theory into his own.

28. Ibid., p. 94.

29. Ibid., p. 95.

Among those writers he incorporates, Jacques Soustelle concluded that races were "no more than aggregates produced by history."³⁰ Guyenat stated it differently: "each population is the heir of generations which have preceded it; each is the daughter of history."³¹ Contrary to these scholars, Georges Montandon acknowledged "the existence of collective heredity for large racial groupings (white, yellow, black)."³² Dr. Theoris "categorically stated that it was a grave biological error and a mortal amputation for a people to separate itself from its past and to forsake its origins." And "Henry Berr, in resuming the thesis of Pittard (in Les Races et l'Histoire) admits the existence of biological heredity but only in terms of evolutionary characteristics of the human being. He even appears to place history as the predominant factor."³³ Jolivet Castellot, in Croquis philosophiques et scientifiques, asserted that "it is impossible for us to get rid of the authority of heredity, the guardian of the future of society through time."³⁴ And "the traditional psychology of Gustave LeBon has always admitted the existence of heredity in transmitting psychic characteristics."³⁵ Auguste Sabattier, who Duvalier called a "christian psychologist", reveals himself to be even

30. Jacques Soustelle quoted in ibid., p. 92.

31. Guyenat [sic] quoted in ibid.

32. Georges Montandon, quoted in ibid.

33. Dr. Theoris quoted in ibid.

34. Jolivet Castellot quoted in ibid., p. 93.

35. Jolivet Castellot quoted in ibid.

more positive in his reliance on psychological determinism, "the heredity which the irresistible weight of the lives of my ancestors imposes upon me, the political order which encloses me in its rules, customs which with time become second nature, historical tradition and the witness of my fellow-man which in time and place enlarge my personal conscience to the limits of humanity's moral experience"

He concludes that "no one can isolate himself from his race and his social cradle."³⁶ Dr. René Martial, in Race, Heredity and Folly, places such a value on history and psychology that the definition of race can be made only through these factors. Moreover, psychological characteristics are so strong that they seem, despite hereditary mixing, to be resistant to change. In his conclusion, Martial emphasizes the importance of history as the instrument which has enabled the race to preserve its guiding or motivating concept of life.³⁷

To conclude his research of historic sources Duvalier turns to the work of Alexandre Baschmakoff, who believed that a nation's "decline is achieved through abandoning its language, its character, and the consciousness of its past."³⁸

Duvalier concluded, then, that Haitians must begin a search of their history for the nation's collective personality. He ends his discussion in an historical-determinist manner, warning the republic that, "without a new orientation of our social education, with the object of improving this character essentially colonial and of bringing ourselves back in time to our spirituality, we risk missing our mission in history."³⁹

36. Auguste Sebastien quoted in ibid.

37. René Martial quoted in ibid.

38. Alexandre Baschmakoff quoted in ibid., p. 95.

39. Ibid., p. 97, emphasis added.

Duvalier and Denis affirmed that accepting the predominantly African historical-cultural heritage instead of the Gallo-Latin was tantamount to accepting the rural peasants as manifestations of the Haitian mentalite.⁴⁰ The authors pointed to the elite's unwillingness to believe that the negro race was intellectually dynamic, or that its original history and culture had been preserved in Haiti, or that this black race had a potentially great destiny.⁴¹ Voodoo, in particular, as the religion of the masses, had constantly been made an object of shame, as a result of the elite's feelings of inferiority.⁴² The mulattoes viewed the religion as a product of magic and gross superstition. It was barbaric, lacking any basis in reason, any refinement, learning or artistic (creative) energies. Duvalier attempted to refute the elite's characterization of the masses and voodoo.

Duvalier and Les Griots gained support for their arguments with assistance from the translated writings⁴³ of a German historical ethnologist, Leo Frobenius (1873-1938). This African explorer and writer was also greatly admired by Leopold S. Senghor, Aime' Cesaire, and others who founded the Négritude movement during the 1930's in Paris. Senghor probably explained most accurately the enthusiasm of the black intellectuals for Frobenius when he pointed out that "it was Frobenius

40. Duvalier and Denis, "Notre mentalité," p. 13.

41. Ibid., p. 26.

42. Duvalier, Oeuvres essentielles, Vol. I, p. 135.

43. Leo Frobenius, Histoire de la civilisation Africaine, trans. by H. Back and D. Ermont (Paris: Gallimand, 1933). and Leo Frobenius, Le Destin des civilisations, trans. by N. Guterman (Paris: Gallimand, 1940).

who, more than any other, . . . reinstated intuitive reason in our eyes and restored its position as pre-eminent."⁴⁴ Senghor went on to write that Frobenius offered to their movement a "basic philosophical explanation" for other négritude concepts such as "emotion", "art", "myth", and "Eurafrica".

In the minds of some blacks, Frobenius satisfactorily refuted the white man's nineteenth century "scientific" emphasis, which had meant teaching the student to despise "emotion" and be guided only by discursive reason.⁴⁵

It will be valuable to give the reader a brief sketch of this academic's approach and his conceptual findings largely as they are outlined by Senghor, since his writings are so important to Duvalier and to the Noiriste conception of the Haitian peasants' and voodoo's role in the formation of the Haitian collective conscience. Such an understanding will also make it clear how Duvalier "rationalized" his "scientific" approach with Frobenius' emotionalism. Frobenius pioneered the comparative historical approach in ethnology, and developed a method to provide historical background for nonliterate cultures and thereby to absorb them into world history. He attempted to understand not only a specific culture, but culture in general, and hence the complete history of the world. While he maintained his aversion to the white man's "scientific" emphasis he used an historical methodology of his own, to explain "the forces and motives that lead to the origin of

⁴⁴. Quoted by Senghor in Eike Haberland, ed. Leo Frobenius 1873-1973: An Anthology, with a forward by Leopold Senghor (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1973), p. vii, emphasis added.

⁴⁵. Quoted by Senghor in ibid.

a culture, the laws governing its course, the relationship between man and culture, and the meaning and goal of historical development."⁴⁶ He opposed the view of linear culture, believing instead that cultures were unique closed organisms possessing their own individual soul and character. In other words, he affirmed the notion of diverse ethnic groups characterized by separate "feelings and ideas, their myths and their ideologies, their customs and their institutions."⁴⁷ Furthermore, he credited to every culture as independent set of laws that determined its development, largely independent of its particular members. His search for these laws focused his attention on a "spiritual center of a culture", from which its impulses are generated from whence all actions of the culture were controlled. He named this spiritual center the "paideuma", the soul of culture, which engulfs men and provides a direction and goal for thier actions. "Every race, then, has its own "paideuma". That is, its own particular capacity for and manner of being 'possessed'."⁴⁸ Frobenius was a product of the atmosphere of his time. Consider the following statements from such eminent anthropologists as A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and Ruth Benedict. Radcliffe-Brown, in his writings, talked about finding "necessary conditions of existence to meet the survival interests of a society."⁴⁹ To perform this task, he

46. Helmut Straube, "Leo Frobenius," International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. 6, pp. 17-20.

47. Quoted by Senghor in Haberland, ed., Leo Frobenius, p. xi.

48. Quoted by Senghor in ibid., p. xii.

49. As quoted in Felix M. Keesing, Cultural Anthropology: The Science of Custom (Toronto: Holt, Reinehart and Winston, 1967), p. 153.

believed one was justified in looking for generalized processes underlying historical events, In like manner, Benedict argued "that each culture came to have its own characteristic 'purpose', 'emotional and intellectual mainspring', 'configuration', 'goals' which pervade the behaviour and institutions of the society concerned."⁵⁰ Thus there is a probing of culture to locate "basic" or "focal" values which provide control and powerful motivation for behaviour.

Frobenius, like Radcliffe-Brown and Benedict, treated culture as if it had an independent existence, while he regarded the individual much as a passive material upon which culture, the active element, was impressed. Frobenius, then, was supporting not only the theory of cultural determinism but that of cultural relativism as well; cultural determinism casting the individual as a passive element, and cultural relativism claiming the individual is dependent for existence on certain focal values.

Frobenius while not dismissing scientific process, i.e. methodology, altogether discussed the primary importance of "intuitive reason" vis-à-vis "scientific" reason (fact). In History he wrote:

More than any other living organism, man is capable of receiving reality Receiving reality means the faculty of being moved by the essence of phenomena - not by the facts but by the reality which gives rise to them, or, in other words, by the essence of the facts.⁵¹

In History and other books, he compared and contrasted what he referred to as the "real" and the "fact", the sense and the sign:

50. Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (New York, 1934) as quoted in ibid., p. 158.

51. As quoted by Senghor in Haberland, ed., Leo Frobenius, p. viii.

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The essence of facts, that is their significance, which we perceive symbolically in the tangible qualities of the things and doings which underlie these facts.⁵²

In Civilization, he writes, that "in feeling, sensitivity is thought . . . what we call civilization is often the expression of the spirit, the language of the spirit, at least when it concerns men whose thought is still and primarily intuitive."⁵³ He goes on to state that art finds its inspiration in feeling or emotion. This was a radical idea for Frobenius' academic generation. "It is superfluous" he states in History "to explain that art is the sense of life and that by penetrating life styles we also approach this essence of these styles."⁵⁴ He continues,

This means that art is primarily the perfection of the essence of life, of that spiritual energy in the other which causes emotion. And note that man when moved, begins to "act", to relieve the other - plant, animal, star (etc) - first to dance it, then to sculpt it, paint it, sing it. The essence of life, I said, which is characterized by the internal form and its behaviour: its rhythm. It is this "possession" of the ego by the Other which explains the difference in style between different artists and -⁵⁵ this is what interests us here - between different races.

"Paiduema" is at the centre of the artist's re-creation. It is the spirit of the culture.⁵⁶

Frobenius asserted that "Man first lives civilization and myth and is later capable of expressing them,"⁵⁷ He went on to point out that the difference is not of the mind, but between the understanding and the spirit:

52. Quoted by Senghor in ibid.

53. Quoted by Senghor in ibid., p. viii.

54. Quoted by Senghor in ibid., p. ix.

55. Quoted by Senghor in ibid.

56. See below for more information on this concept.

57. Quoted by Senghor in ibid., p. x.

It is a question of the limitation of the faculty of human perception, which is on the one hand intellectual and conditioned by the senses and on the other paideumatic . . . and conditioned by feeling. This opposition between the most important organs which unite us with life may correspond to a fission of the world which surrounds us into a realm of factual phenomenon and a realm of real phenomena.⁵⁸

In other words, myths should be perceived as both works of art and as part of Négritude's values.

Duvalier affirmed the importance of Frobenius' view of primitive man for Haitian culture, firstly because the ideas are crucial while the Republic's culture "yet remains at a primary, inferior stage,"⁵⁹ "Leaders", Duvalier writes,

must understand this scientific truth: always conform all socio-political organization or activities to the evolutionary style of the group they have been called upon to lead.⁶⁰

Secondly, the work of Frobenius allowed one to affirm and interpret the usefulness of the voodoo religion.

Duvalier posited two techniques for scientific research. He stated that the two methods were opposed to one another. One method involved the rational observation, classification, and the systemization of facts while the other, more recent technique "tries to grasp through the multiplicity of facts the transmutation of phenomena, the interior and permanent reality."⁶¹ This latter format was Frobenius' conceptualization of science and was what Duvalier called "in-depth vision of the world and humanity."

58. Quoted by Senghor in ibid., p. ix.

59. Duvalier, Oeuvres essentielles, Vol. I, p. 135.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid., p. 139.

"Paideuma" or power of feelings stated Duvalier, allows one to "operate at a higher level than that of the absolute or pure reality."⁶²

Perception of this reality, however, "is in man a function of temperament and degree of civilization."⁶³

Privileged groups such as children and primitive men have this ability "to go further than we do" since they treat the world without timidity "as if the secrets of the reproductive forces were immediately accessible to them."⁶⁴

Duvalier noted that Frobenius and Lucien Levy-Bruhl were in agreement with what the latter called "primitive mentality", a theory Levy-Bruhl himself was later to reject.⁶⁵

Feeling, one of the predominant forces from earliest times expressed itself in art, which was the creative force of primitive cultures. The "paideuma" allowed man to touch the essence of his subject - the phenomena of expression. Cosmic reality provoked this expression of emotion or feeling. Voodoo, declared Duvalier, has its base in primitive cosmology. Reasoning and thought were eventually substituted for the "paideuma", ushering in the era of large-scale exploitation.

The techniques of the animal engendered harmony.
The techniques of the plant engendered agriculture.
The feelings of cosmic reality engendered astronomy.
Similarly, the primeval spirituality of humanity was
denegated through the ages to prostitute itself in
modern materialism.⁶⁶

62. Ibid., p. 140.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., pp. 148-149.

This represents what Frobenius had called the metaphysical cure for knowledge. Duvalier warned the reader that evolution does not always ideally follow this sequence. Similarly, the modalities of prelogical thought persist in the depths of the modern mentalite. Duvalier suggested that

Even more, serious scientific thinkers of the metropolis, after having delved into the past for many thousands of years, and having penetrated into the levels of the human soul, seem to be proposing to the civilized of this century, who are smitten with positivism, certain manifestations of the primitive conscience, as an ideal to which they must return if they⁶⁷ do not wish to unlearn the meaning of primary realities.

Duvalier refers to Frobenius, who exhorted the German generation of the Versailles treaty to get rid of its borrowed mentalite and to withdraw itself in order to grasp, by contact with its intimate reality, the goal of its mission in history.⁶⁸ In like manner, Duvalier called on his own people to look to the grandeur of the ethnic past, and the spiritual potential of its traditions. He also admonished Haitians that

Only ethnic past, spiritual traditions are capable of revealing to us our inner psychic identity and the meaning (direction) of our orientation among the concert of peoples.⁶⁹

Duvalier next attempted to prove that voodoo was part of the Republic's original past and was therefore a vital force in creating a specific Haitian thought and a reunifying national soul.⁷⁰ He begins his proof by stating that there existed three major cultures during the middle

67. Ibid., p. 149.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid., p. 150.

70. Ibid., p. 161.

stone age: the Ethiopians of Combe-Capelle, the whites of Cro-Magnon, and the Negroid of Grimbaldi, and that the negroid paleolithic culture was on par with the others. Duvalier continued that recent investigations had disclosed the existence of an autonomous and independent culture, called the equatorial culture, which developed during the late stone age. This culture had been found in three places in the world, one of which was West Africa.

What was the spiritual conception and world view of this culture? The author makes a distinction between North-west Africa, where the Lamite-Berber civilization dominated, and West Africa, where the Negro-Ethiopian civilization was dominant. Each culture had a different world view; the first Duvalier calls the Hyperborean (North European) and the second Equatorial.

The Hyperborean world view makes a clear distinction between the "I" and the world. Man is subject and the environment object. Man acts in his environment, with the use of force and magic. Man also distinguishes between body and soul. The soul must be freed from the body and only the soul can go from one body to another. The "divide and rule" dogma follows naturally from this concept. Spirits of the environment are considered to be independent of one another, and man can use some spirits as aids. Magicians, then, became very powerful. This culture emphasized "will" and the play (jeu) of will. In contrast, the Equatorial world view conceives the universe from a "totalist" perspective. There is no separation between body and soul. Decomposition of the body does not imply separation of the soul; rather, from the skull a new life may grow, like a germinating seed. Life must be lived in harmony with nature.

The decline of the body is linked to the phase of the moon. The culture emphasizes "abandonment" and the play (jeu) of abandonment - mystical rather than magical.

Thus, although both cultures believe in a supreme mover, their applications of belief are divergent. The Hyperborean feels that his animating spirit is capable of acting upon the universe and as a consequence he affirms his personality in opposition to the natural environment. Duvalier then continues to show how voodooism is directly linked to an Ethiopian conception of the world.

These two concepts of world and humanity have evolved to reach sublime heights in modern philosophy, where today, thinkers adhere to one of two schools regarding matter, life, the soul, and the individual. These are spiritualism and positivism.

To paraphrase Duvalier, the spiritualist, whose native idealism was close to that of the Ethiopians, declared that matter is above all, tendency and virtuality, or force "all these characteristics are only compatible with a proper spiritual existence."⁷¹ In contrast, the positivist, in whom the Hyperborean will to dominate has been exchanged for the factual mentalite, affirm the futility of human attempts to comprehend the absolute. One possible procedure remains: to discover the laws which govern phenomena, for the purpose of dominating matter.

Duvalier concluded his treatment by suggesting that, if these two traditional representatives of the world and of humanity are the essence of individual temperaments, that is, the highest expression of

⁷¹. Ibid., p. 160.

the inner conscience of a people, then they should be assignable to one of two major groups, depending upon which view is dominant: these groups are the Hyperborean and the Ethiopian, that is the caucasian and the negroid.

Duvalier, then, asked what practical conclusions these speculative considerations hold? He answered that in the light of such data,

voodoo appears in no way to be a product of magic or gross superstition. Developed on the soil of Africa, reflecting its agonizing mystery, an achievement of a spirituality going back to a legendary past, it nonetheless remains the transcendental expression of the conscience of a race in the face of the enigmas of this world.⁷²

Voodoo is essentially cosmological, philosophical and spiritual; cosmological because it demands from surrounding nature the symbols to render concrete the play of cosmic forces; philosophical, because voodoo reflects a conception of life, of matter, and of the soul; spiritual, because it proclaims the survival of the soul by making divine the spirits of the ancestors.⁷³

And if, as the sociologists claim, the Haitian people have an "emotive" constitution (Dr. Price-Mars), if, they are withdrawn and their everyday life is steeped in the subconscious, this is merely because they are profoundly subservient to the determinism of the race.

Duvalier concluded his rationalization of voodoo by proclaiming that although it does not please western-oriented mulattoes, it can create a specifically Haitian thought and reinforce the nation's identity.⁷⁴ He also pointed out that voodoo "by perpetuating for the present the archaic forms of prehistoric cultures, by presenting genetic relationships

⁷². Ibid., p. 161.

⁷³. Ibid.

⁷⁴. Ibid.

. . . with the oldest religions of humanity, bears witness that civilization is a homogeneous 'all'; which since the beginning has never, in any of its components, lost its human links. And even when it seemed isolated, it has never lost contact with continuing human institutions."⁷⁵ Duvalier insisted that in order to understand voodoo, it was necessary to understand Africa and the moral and socio-political life of its peoples.

The roots of the Haitian failure, for Duvalier, lay in the country's "heavy psycho-biological heritage".⁷⁶ This pathological heritage could be traced back to the type of social system which emerged during the colonial period. He characterized the "present day Haitian society . . . as a prolongation of colonial society."⁷⁷ For Duvalier, then, 1804 represented an evolution and not a revolution, since revolution for him is tantamount to a profound transformation of the social mentalite. The change of mentalite can only occur through an alteration in values and institutions so far-reaching that the modification constitutes a new national conscience. He insisted that education play a key role in this transformation.

Education was considered a "basic institution" and it was imperative that the elites give it primary consideration. Duvalier felt that change in the political and social order could only occur "if their substance is already germinated in the spirit of the culture."⁷⁸ He referred to

⁷⁵. Ibid., p. 161.

⁷⁶. Ibid., p. 53.

⁷⁷. Ibid., p. 54.

⁷⁸. Ibid., pp. 64-65.

the Third Reich and Kemal Ataturk as two examples where "spiritual mobilization" through educational reforms changed the public mentalité.⁷⁹ Schooling, then, was the crucial superstructure on which to erect a national identity and culture. The type of instruction must conform to the nation's traditions and morals "which remain essential and permanent because they find substance in [an] historical past."⁸⁰ Hence, history was the subject upon which to base the education of a people; for it imparted the nation's morals and traditions and, in effect, created a national consciousness. Educators performed an important role in teaching the correct mental attitude.

Duvalier strongly opposed the Republic's contemporary educational system. He considered it a "non-integrating force for the race."⁸¹ The irrational educational system had resulted in a denial of the people's African origins. History and geography books wrongly described the negro as culturally and intellectually inferior to the white race. The nation was ashamed of its African heritage. Duvalier warned that the people's rejection of their African past tended to create a dangerous feeling of social inferiority, a mental climate which prevented the formation of a true collective conscience, and stressed a false one based on European values.

The first step toward solving the problem, Duvalier stated, is to nationalize education both "in a national and racial sense." The term "racial" implied the removal of white Francophile religious teaching orders. Duvalier underlined the danger of these orders both in the past and in

79. Ibid., pp. 62-63.

80. Ibid., p. 66.

81. Ibid., p. 63.

the future of Haiti. He demanded "Is it not generally contended that the missionaries came here, not primarily to evangelize, but rather to nurture the French influence in this small country of negroes?"⁸²

Duvalier requested the immediate secularization of teaching, particularly of courses on national history, followed eventually by secularization of the total educational system. He based his insistence that the clergy be dismissed on the claim that it had falsified and denatured the teaching of Haitian history and placed it in a position subordinate to that of French history. Thus the values taught by the clergy "operate to the moral and cultural detriment of our students."⁸³ History above all "must be taught by indigenous people in whom vibrates the soul of the nation and the race."⁸⁴

82. Ibid., p. 104.

83. Ibid., p. 105.

84. Ibid.

CHAPTER V

It might be useful to summarize the foregoing analysis of Duvalier's ideas before turning to his written history of Haiti and his subsequent blueprint for political change. It is significant that Duvalier operated within a cultural-determinist and cultural-relativist framework as did Radcliffe-Brown and Benedict. Speaking the language of the historical determinist, he argued that the nation's continuous political instability had resulted from the failure of the Republic to realize its proper historical destiny. As opposed to the false collective mentalite or conscience which had mislead Haiti; one promoted by the foreign francophile white teaching orders and by the mulatto elite, Duvalier argued the ethnological and historical theories of Leo Frobenius, Georges Mantondon, and Georges Hardy, to exonerate voodoo and the folkways of the peasantry, and to establish them as integral components of the "genuine" Haitian culture. He also denied elite claims that the peasants were an ignorant and illiterate "horde". Using Frobenius and Levy-Bruhl as primary sources, Duvalier maintained that the blacks were not intellectually inferior but that they functioned socially upon a pre-logical "tribal" level. Finally, he also called upon Alexandre Baschmakoff and other psychological and anthropological theorists to support his thesis that mentalite is determined by biological factors which in turn determine the psychological characteristics of a people.

The defence of the blacks which Duvalier and Denis adopted was an intellectual offensive against the mulatto elite. Duvalier and Denis, in a series of articles published in Chantiers during 1946, challenged the

mulattoes' interpretation of the colonial struggle, together with their dismissal of Toussaint and Dessalines in favour of Pétion and Boyer, and their assertion that the period between 1843-1915 was a political catastrophe because ignorant illiterate black generals governed the Republic. Two essays by Duvalier and Denis, which appeared in book-form under the title Problème des Classes à travers l'Histoire d'Haiti, are crucial since they (with Duvalier's Oeuvres essentielles, Vol. I) constitute the "black legend" and part of the doctrine for the new black middle class.¹

More than half of the political-sociological analysis of Haitian history in Problème des Classes à travers l'Histoire d'Haiti is devoted to the events and personalities of the colonial struggle. The authors give, as their reason for this, that one must consider the society's beginnings to determine its present psychological and sociological behavior.² The historical research in preparing their essays led them to the conclusion that Haiti's backwardness was due in part to its heavily colonial heritage,³ a legacy which manifested itself in serious misunderstandings between the mulattoes and the blacks. The two writers insisted that to explore and resolve the problem the question of color must be openly discussed and subjected to correction by appropriate educational and social policies.⁴ The approach used in finding "rational

1. Duvalier's two books were originally journal articles only later published in book form, without having been edited by the authors. The present writer has attempted to extract Duvalier's essential ideas from the "oeuvres inédites", a task never before attempted by social scientists.

2. Duvalier and Denis, Problème des Classes, pp. 3-4.

3. Ibid., p. vii, Introduction.

4. Ibid., p. viii, Introduction.

solutions" to their problems was based on the employment of "scientific" tenets.⁵

Duvalier concluded that two lessons had emerged from an analysis of Haitian colonial struggles for independence; first, that color is an issue; and second, that the tendency of the elites was always to disassociate themselves from the masses. The consequence of these conditions was always failure. He concluded also:

- (a) That what was needed was a "politics of equilibrium";
- (b) That the behaviour of the black chiefs proved that all revolution, if it is to be profound and durable, must be aimed at redeeming the masses;
- (c) That there is a need for an "authentic" leader alligned with the masses;
- (d) That all governments which rely upon popular forces incur the displeasure of the elites.⁶

Even a brief outline of Duvalier's interpretation of colonial events demonstrates why he characterized the mulatto elites as exclusionists. Duvalier and Denis begin their analysis in the manner used by other authorities in Haiti, with a description of three classes in Saint Domingue: that of the large colonial landowners; that of the freemen; and finally that of the slaves which contained a majority of blacks and a minority of mulattoes. They described the social and economic position enjoyed by the mulattoes as "an outrage against human dignity." The Affranchis owned one third of the land and one quarter of the slaves.⁷

5. Ibid., p. 104.

6. Duvalier, Oeuvres essentielles, Vol. I, p. 43.

7. Duvalier and Denis, Problème des Classes, p. 58.

The cruel behaviour exhibited by the mulattoes toward their slaves was carefully documented with examples.⁸ The gens de couleur, moreover, were losing the rights gained for them under Code Noir. They attempted to regain these rights following the 1789 revolution in France. Duvalier and Denis bitterly attacked the mulatto's role during the first days of the revolution:

When the first hours of demands for justice struck, one had a right to expect, both from a biological and a political point of view, that the leaders of this intermediate class would merge their interests⁹ and their future with those of the great mass of blacks.

The "Oge' affair" and the "300 Swiss tragedy", however, are historical examples of the elites' repudiation of the slave class. That Vincent Oge' led an army made up exclusively of mulattoes "was a symbol of his class."¹⁰ He made demands only on behalf of his class.¹¹ The mulattoes had planned to win back their rights under the Code Noir while retaining the slave system. Their use of the "300 Swiss" was nothing more than a political maneuver to win full equality with the whites and a further manifestation of Affranchis exclusivism. The death of the 300 slaves also demonstrated the lesson "that no sincere leader could be found in the Affranchis or mulatto class who would keep the interests of the slaves foremost."¹² It was therefore necessary for a leader to arise from the slave caste. The authors concluded in an historical-determinist manner that it was the destiny of Boukman and Toussaint to act as the

8. Ibid., pp. 7-9.

9. Ibid., p. 56.

10. Ibid., p. 13.

11. Ibid., p. 56.

12. Ibid., p. 14.

designated martyrs for the regeneration of their black class.¹³

Duvalier referred to Boukman's genius in using voodoo to "fuse" the various tribes.

Toussaint and his role in the independence movement was carefully discussed to disprove that part of mulatto legend which belittled his special revolutionary position.¹⁴ Toussaint was described as the first Haitian patriot, "a truly mystic centre i.e. public focus who prepared his people for independence and national unity."¹⁵ He was a symbol of the deep aspirations and the tendencies of the black masses of St. Domingue¹⁶ His efforts were frustrated by the greed of the whites and the prejudice of the mulattoes. The Duvalier account pointed out that the mulattoes joined the English upon hearing that Sonthanax had emancipated the slaves.¹⁷ Then the mulattoes fought against the republican armies of Toussaint. When Toussaint later defeated his rebellious Lieutenant Villate in the North, it was described as "a landmark in the fight of the blacks for national independence."¹⁸ The victory prevented the mulattoes from occupying the North although they already held the South under Rigaud. Duvalier and Denis dwell on the civil war between Toussaint and Rigaud in which the two belligerents represented the essence of the class conflict - a conflict between factions separated only by color. The two authors argued that Rigaud was jealous of the prestige accorded

13. Ibid.

14. It will be remembered that the mulatto historians wrote that Toussaint's role in the independence movement was minimal and that Rigaud was the real leader. See above pp. 35 and 40, Chapter II. Duvalier, Oeuvres essentielles, Vol. I, p. 129.

15. Ibid., p. 129.

16. Duvalier and Denis, Probleme des Classes, p. 46.

17. Ibid., p. 97.

18. Ibid.

Toussaint in his promotion to Général de Division and Général en chef de l'armée de St. Domingue.¹⁹

When Toussaint and Rigaud spoke on the eve of the civil war their speeches provided glaring evidence of the color and class conflict. Toussaint spoke bitterly about Rigaud's rebellious actions, and asked the blacks, in his Catholic speech, why Rigaud refused to recognize their common interest and obey Toussaint:

Why does General Rigaud refuse to obey me?

It is because I Am Black. . .²⁰

Rigaud had stated

Brothers of the South, know it well, there exist in this country two classes of men, the disgusting and incapable class and the sympathetic and intelligent class.²¹

He then exhorted the mulattoes to join with the latter and aid him in pushing "these inferior beings incapable of society" back into the mountains. Duvalier and Denis also compared the abilities of the two generals as leaders. They described Toussaint as "the genius of our race" because he, unlike such mulattoes as Rigaud, Pétion and Boyer, did not base his government on exclusivist policies.²² For them, Toussaint was obsessed by the idea of uniting the two classes.²³ In contrast, Rigaud was

unfortunately blinded by the colonial ideology and his hereditary tendencies, he was unable to raise himself to the level of these magnanimous conceptions of Toussaint,

19. Ibid., p. 30.

20. Ibid., p. 46.

21. Ibid., p. 51.

22. Ibid., p. 99.

23. Ibid., p. 51.

to combine in the same ideal of common rehabilitation
the destiny of two human groups which nevertheless belong
to only one race . . .²⁴

Duvalier and Denis, then, proposed that Haitians acknowledge Toussaint as an inspirational force and follow his vision of a unified nation. They also emphasized Toussaint's dream of an elite dedicated to the real interests of the people.²⁵

The brevity of Jean Jacques Dessalines' rule also emphasized their conclusions about the elite's behaviour; the two writers observed that the mulattoes would not tolerate a leader who set out to make of the masses a united whole, all on an equal footing, a charge in support of which they produced a statement by Dessalines:

Negroes and mulattoes, we have all fought against the whites, the property we have conquered with our blood belongs to us all; I intend to see it divided equitably.²⁶

Sentiments such as this, Duvalier and Denis stated, induced the elite to abandon Dessalines. Quoting Antoine Firmin's history they described how "Dessalines was scandalized by their extortions, by their pillaging of the estates and other audacious peculations."²⁷ Again making reference to Firmin, Duvalier and Denis concluded that the elite supported

24. Ibid., p. 51.

25. An elite with both a political and social conscience was a major theme in Dessalines' history of Haiti. More will be said about this later.

26. Maidou, Vol. III pp. 247-248 as quoted in Duvalier and Denis, Problème des Classes, pp. 58-59.

27. Antoine Firmin, Roosevelt and Haiti, as quoted in Duvalier, Oeuvres essentielles, Vol. I, p. 324.

Dessalines as long as he gave them freedom to ravage the state. Dessalines' eventual assassination was seen as a result of his "having shown solicitous interest in the lot of the masses, in return for having made a reality of this principle of equity by demanding a just apportionment of lands . . ."²⁸ Duvalier and Denis end their discussion of this "first Haitian socialist" with a salute to his martyrdom in the cause of the masses. They demanded that his life of sacrifice serve as a model. It is interesting to note that there is no mention of Dessalines' use of coercion to keep the ex-slaves on the plantations.

Jean Pierre Boyer and his Code Rural were described as "the prototype of bourgeois exclusivism."²⁹ It was asserted as an effort to re-establish slavery and to create an aristocracy of the minority to the detriment of the principle of equality.³⁰ The essayists quoted the writings of Louis Joseph Janvier, a nineteenth century economist who had described Boyer's land policy as the most incredible social and economic crime ever committed by any head of state. Janvier wrote that "it constitutes the enslavement of the peasant which had been timidly started in 1821: it stops the economic growth of the country, and sterilizes the nation."³¹ Meanwhile, the elite moved to the towns and were awarded civil-service positions in return for their support of the Boyer regime. His administration represented the climax of the mulatto exclusivism.³²

28. Duvalier and Denis, Problème des Classes, p. 59.

29. Duvalier, Oeuvres essentielles, Vol. I, p. 325.

30. Duvalier and Denis, Problème des Classes, pp. 59-64.

31. Duvalier, Oeuvres essentielles, Vol. I, p. 325.

32. Duvalier and Denis, Problème des Classes, p. 60.

The subsequent revolution of 1843 brought about by the mulattoes with the support of the black masses once again demonstrated the treachery of the elite. They surrendered to the blacks' demands for ending exclusivism by inventing la politique de doublure which consisted of placing an illiterate black without personality in the presidency as a "front man" to reign while the mulattoes actually governed. Of the first four presidents (1843-1847) only Pierrot did not conform to this political charade. Guerrier, Riviere, and Riché were instruments of the elite and did not hesitate to slaughter blacks who rebelled against the system. Pierrot's attempt "to incorporate the Dessalinean ideal" through agrarian reform was quickly crushed. Riché's death created a problem of succession which was settled by bringing the illiterate General Soulouque to power.

Duvalier and Denis characterized Haitian politics between 1843 and 1915 as chaotic. However, statesmen "who were moments of the national conscience" and whose actions manifested "the moral values of the Haitian nation, "appeared from time to time."³³ The author's use of the word moment (instant) is interesting as a description of men who were landmarks in Haitian history. Soulouque, Salnave, Salomon, and Antoine Simon were such moments. Duvalier and Denis characterized them as "democratic men", "men of action", "revolutionaries", and "lovers of the masses".³⁴

The authors described Soulouque as an illiterate but responsible man who was able and cunning. He refused to act as a tool of the elite. Duvalier maintained that Soulouque's personality was a natural evolvement

33. Ibid., p. 69.

34. Ibid., p. 66.

from his ancestors: "Soulouque came from the depths of his race, since he descended from the Mandinques, this tribe which was fertile in leaders of the people" ³⁵

Duvalier defended Soulouque against the charges that he was a brutal butcher as exemplified by his massacres of mulattoes. He asked the reader what wrongs Soulouque had committed towards the country as head of state to incur such extreme hatred? He answered himself, "only one, that of having refused to be the torturer of men of his class in order to continue the privileges of the minority." ³⁶ Duvalier also cited Firmin's defence of Soulouque's massacre. Firmin urged the reader to understand Soulouque's political predicament, to note that blacks too had been slaughtered, and that

although we deplore what happened during this affair, we must recognize that Soulouque found himself in a situation where he had either to let himself be disarmed by the ³⁷bourgeoise or use force to impose silence upon them.

Duvalier's rationalization and justification of Soulouque's heavy-handed methods for controlling the mulattoes in building his power base possibly offers us an interesting insight into Duvalier's vindication of his own later presidential actions against the mulattoes.

Duvalier also surmised from Soulouque's political measures that this black president had understood the elite's exclusivist attitudes. Nevertheless, Soulouque pursued a politics of equilibrium, which for Duvalier did not mean the traditional social arithmetic compromise "on

³⁵. Duvalier, Oeuvres essentielles, Vol. I, p. 327.

³⁶. Ibid., p. 329.

³⁷. Firmin as quoted in ibid., p. 328.

the eve" of all cabinet meetings, three blacks and two mulattoes or vice versa. It was above all an equilibrium between the internal forces and not one between the black military generals and the mulatto aristocracy. Duvalier believed the latter form of government led only to a dispute about the public treasury. Soulouque, then, created a "uniform temperament and mentalite" by not allowing the public office "to be the lot of a special group of citizens under an often unjustified assumption of ability."³⁸ Thus, Duvalier concluded that Soulouque's rule affirmed the generalization that a "policy of equilibrium is required because of our demographic structure and because of the exclusivist tendencies of the minority."³⁹

Duvalier and Denis considered Geffard's mulatto government, which replaced Soulouque, to be a semi-progressive government. Geffard tended at times to practice a policy of equilibrium, wrote Duvalier, but only under pressure from various black leaders.

The Griots' choice of President Sylvain Salnave as one black leader who represented a moment of "genuine national conscience" is a curious one in the opinion of the present writer. It will be remembered that Salnave's government had been described by mulatto and U.S. historians as two years of constant civil war. And black historians also have failed to express enthusiasm for Salnave's brief tenure. Nevertheless, Duvalier and Denis maintained that he governed in the spirit of Dessalines, and portrayed him as a "lover of the masses". They did not accept the

38. Ibid., p. 328.

39. Ibid., p. 329.

traditional position that Salnave had seized power only to give it up reluctantly after two years of bloody fighting. Nor did Duvalier and Denis accept the general academic view that Salnave was eventually put to death by a firing squad because he defended the cause of the large peasant class. In fact, Duvalier suggested that Salnave had voluntarily retired from the presidency because he desired to hold power only if the people granted him the supreme position.⁴⁰ Duvalier concluded that if Salnave's government had not been destroyed by the mulattoes it "would have had all the chances of developing toward a democratic dictatorship, [sic] while his disciples would have evolved toward a Haitian liberalism."⁴¹ The nefarious activities of the elite, however, prevented the development of Salnave's government. Duvalier stated that the elite did not like Salnave because he allowed the "common people of our good country . . . the people whom persons of society or the elites and most politicians carefully avoided",⁴² to enter the palace.⁴³ The two writers submitted that Salnave's continuous confrontation with the elites illustrates an axiom: "all government which relies upon the POPULAR FORCES incurs the disapproval of the Elites of the First Zone."⁴⁴

Duvalier and Denis believed that General Lysius Félicité Salomon "would remain the greatest leader of the Haitian masses". Interestingly,

40. Duvalier, Oeuvres essentielles, Vol. I, p. 331.

41. Ibid., p. 330.

42. Ibid., p. 331.

43. Ibid., p. 330.

44. Duvalier and Denis, Problème des Classes, p. 63, (by First Zone they undoubtedly meant the mulatto elite.)

they refer to his 1883 land reform policy as "the great law". It will be remembered that all social historians had believed this reform to be a disaster and written in the same spirit as Boyer's 1826 Code Rural. The writers also praised his inauguration of civil service competitions as a wise measure "to discipline impatient ambition."⁴⁵

For them, Salomon, as leader of the National Party, also displayed the qualities of a "democratic man" by supporting the principle "power to the greatest number, while the liberals . . . claim power should go to the most capable."⁴⁶ Duvalier and Denis vehemently attacked this liberal or mulatto elite doctrine of "power to the most capable". They asked their readers which characteristics these people possessed which made them indispensable? The black writers responded:

The most capable were the sons of the bourgeois who benefitted from the great estates of the State to the detriment of the exploited masses, and who therefore had the means of sending his children to Paris for their studies.⁴⁷

They continued their criticism by insisting that this class had failed "at every crucial moment" of the nation's history including the "most grievous moment (meaning 1915)."⁴⁸ They concluded with the statement that "the state does not represent the interests of only one group or one caste, and the government is not the spokesman on one group or one

^{45.} Ibid., p. 66.

^{46.} Ibid., p. 64.

^{47.} Ibid., pp. 64-65.

^{48.} Ibid., p. 65.

caste but of all people in its history."⁴⁹

Antoine Simon also was considered a "moment of the national conscience", "a democratic man", "a man of action", "revolutionary", and a "lover of the masses". He possessed "good sense, love of country, and respect for national traditions."⁵⁰ He was described as "one of our chiefs of state who fought the most against the evil tendencies of the bourgeoisie."⁵¹ It will be remembered that Simon had borrowed heavily to start a series of public works. He exercised little control over his projects and firms and individuals involved received little or no preliminary investigation. Nevertheless, Duvalier and Denis unequivocally state that he sincerely worked for the well-being of the poor masses and that "hatred, envy, and the spirit of gain" exhibited by the elite destroyed all his plans and projects.

Duvalier and Denis concluded that a review of Haitian history revealed four fundamental problems facing a leader in solving the class issue. Their statement of the problems were translated into direct action when Duvalier came to power. First, the leader is caught between the greed of the elite and the furor of the masses who perceive the leader as acquiescing to the elite's greed. Second, color prejudice is used in political as well as social relations. The third and fourth difficulties, which they describe as more scientific in character, were the absence of any coordination between the bourgeois class and the, as yet germinal, proletariat class, and the problem of factionalism among the bourgeois families.⁵²

49. Ibid.

50. Duvalier, Oeuvres essentielles, Vol. I, p. 333.

51. Duvalier and Denis, Problème des Classes, p. 66.

52. Ibid., p. 257.

What characteristics did a leader need to be able successfully to integrate these groups and what should be the social structures adopted? It was shown in the fourth chapter how Duvalier and Denis agreed that the peculiar psychological characteristics of a race would have an effect on the form of suitable social structure and government. These laws of heredity, for Duvalier, dictated the permanence of specific characteristics and their increasing ability to reproduce themselves in an unbroken line in the character of their descendants. This line of thought occurred with Arthur de Gobineau's notion that "distinct races do exist in the world, and that the distinction is basically a biological one."⁵³ Duvalier and Denis make few references to this European racial theorist although they seem to agree often with his ideas on the type of political leadership and institutions needed in Haiti. Needless to say, they did not agree with his racial slurs. Gobineau stressed that institutions which might be appropriate for one society will not necessarily be adequate for other societies. "Bad institutions", wrote Gobineau,

are those which however well they work on paper, are not in harmony with the national qualities or caprices, and so do not suit a particular state, though they might be very successful in the neighbouring country. They would bring only anarchy and disorder, even if they were taken from the statute book of the angels.⁵⁴

Gobineau also maintained that the impossibility of successfully exporting political institutions was an even greater problem where we are faced by an entirely different race. Gobineau referred to Haiti and to the Sandwich Islands as two examples of "governments formed on European

⁵³. Gobineau, Inequality, p. 37.

⁵⁴. Ibid., pp. 41-42.

models by people different from us [white Europeans] in race."⁵⁵

Gobineau criticizes the results of the Haitian attempt to transpose the European model to Haiti while leaving "nothing African. ... in the Statute laws."⁵⁶ He argued that it would be more beneficial to allow the black man to return quite freely to the despotic, patriarchial system that is naturally suited to those of his brethren on whom the conquering Mussulmans of Africa have not yet laid their yoke."⁵⁷ Duvalier agreed with Gobineau; the solution to Haitian problems must be uniquely Haitian and not a borrowed European one.

Duvalier also appeared to agree with the Count's ideas on political leadership. Gobineau defined a "true spirit of government" as knowing "how to preserve the past while meeting the needs of the present."⁵⁸ Gobineau suggested that this need to reconcile past and present required increasingly sterner rule. It required an elite, in terms both of class and race. The functions of this elite was to preserve, as far as possible, not only itself but social order too, since laws and institutions were allegedly emanations from racial foundations. The elite, then is above the state and its political obligations are only to the monarch who personifies the people. Gobineau described monarchy as the most rational manner of organizing government, and he explained his reasoning thus:

55. Ibid., p. 46.

56. Ibid., p. 48.

57. Ibid., p. 51.

58. Biddiss, Racist Ideology, p. 159.

a people always needs a man who understands its will and epitomizes, explains and leads it where it needs to go. If he errs, the people resist and rises to follow him who will not go astray. This is clear evidence of the need for constant interplay between the collective will and the individual will. In order to get a positive result, it is necessary⁵⁹ for the two wills to unite. Separated they are useless.

Duvalier defined his conception of an elite in terms of the sociology of Saint Simon who argued the necessity of a disinterested elite which would rule for the good of all the nation. However, Duvalier's ideology, which eulogized the masses and scorned the mulattoes, meant that these political cadres ruled largely in the interests of the masses. In Duvalier's own words:

Political power must be considered as a means to an end, namely; to realize the happiness of the masses which make up the basic entity of any society. This ideal was that of the most prominent thinkers of that time, since the sociology of Saint Simon claimed as its basic principle that the given political system draws its strength from the services rendered to the [portion of] society which forms the poorest class.⁶⁰

Thus Duvalier argued that an examination of the relations among the social classes today reveals no change. For the descendants of the Affranchis, the mulattoes, continue to ignore the suffering and sorrow of the proletariat in the town and countryside.⁶¹ Duvalier explained that

⁵⁹. Ibid., p. 159. Gobineau's argument becomes clearer if one understands that he was criticizing the French nobility for their own general failure to understand their duty to the monarch.

⁶⁰. Duvalier, Souvenirs d'autrefois (Bric-à-brac) 1926-1948 par Abderahman pseud. Edition speciale n.d. Presses Nationales d'Haiti.

⁶¹. Duvalier and Denis, Problème des Classes, p. 15.

in speaking of this "pompous elite who have baptised themselves with the necessary qualities, we understand by this that they deem themselves obliged to control power" and have repressed the middle and peasant classes as though they were a despicable lot."⁶² He suggested then that a commonality of interests existed between the masses and his own class, the new black middle class. He questioned the significance of this mutual interest and its relationship to past black leaders like Toussaint, Soulouque, and others:

Isn't it that we are actually living in another epoch of our History when collective aspirations are crystallized in some self-conscious leaders of the class so as to become the highest exponent . . . emulating the aspirations and traditions of an entire class of men?⁶³

Thus arguing from an historical-determinist view he concluded that just as a Toussaint arose in a time of chaos, or a Soulouque, so also would another leader. This leader would provide an organization for the masses that would integrate the peasants and working classes in the national community in order to achieve "the moral unity of the Haitian ethnic [community]."⁶⁴ In Duvalier's own words:

If the collectivities are subject to the laws of historical determinism, if our community is truly confronting, at the crossroads of its existence, a genuine internal disequilibrium, a mixture of apparently chaotic events, there will spring up, as formerly in St. Domingue, one of these representative individuals . . . who in his personal synthesis polarizes the anguish, the hopes and also the will of a class of men, [who incorporate the spirit] of such men as Toussaint,⁶⁵ Dessalines, Christophe, founders of empire and nation.

62. Duvalier, Oeuvres essentielles, Vol. I, p. 323.

63. Duvalier and Denis, Problème des Classes, p. 15.

64. Ibid., p. 66.

65. Ibid., p. 20.

Duvalier believed, then, that the good leader would be primarily an instrument of history and a partial creator of it.⁶⁶ He referred to the new leader as an authentic representative of the masses.

The type of leadership proposed must emulate the African mentalité of the people. African government was popularly believed by many members of the Griots to be founded on despotic and authoritarian traditions. This conception must be understood in conjunction with their insistence on the importance of the organic community in Africa, and on the importance which black Africans placed upon team work rather than on competition. Individualism, then, was considered a manifestation of colonial rule. The Griots have emphasized in this passage the Haitian Combite - a system of communal work or action in the fields in exchange for the same services by other members of the community. David Nicholls brilliantly describes those Griots who stressed the need for a strong political leadership or even dictatorship:

Carl Brouard stated that democracy is inappropriate for a backward country, and K. Georges-Jacobs referred to democratic and republican institutions as window-dressing designed to mislead the masses. Price-Mars was quoted by Diaquoi to the effect that the democratic formulae enshrined in Haitian legal and constitutional documents were devoid of sense; being out of harmony with the customs of the people, they only served to justify the exploitation of the masses by the elite. Diaquoi himself referred to such institutions as freedom of press, free elections, a constitutional opposition, and democracy itself as sordid tinsel, while Rene Piquon maintained that Haiti needed a strong dictatorship reinforced by a mystique of authority⁶⁷ which can sanctify force even in the eyes of those it crushes.

⁶⁶. Ibid., p. 16.

⁶⁷. David Nicholls, "Biology and Politics in Haiti," pp. 410-411.

Duvalier's thoughts on leadership and its relations to the masses written before he came to power had a fundamental impact on his behaviour while president of Haiti. Reviewing his speeches after he came to power makes this clearly evident.⁶⁸ In the following analysis no attempt is made to document or excuse Duvalier's systematic elimination of his opposition; the present inquiry deals only with his ideas and their reflection in his handling of power.

These speeches given between 1957 and 1970 were written for an insecure, newly formed, nationalistic middle class and an urban proletariat audience; they make repeated references to the past black Haitian presidents and to academics whom Duvalier had cited in his writings. He had described his Duvalieriste Revolution to a Mexican journalist as one "born of . . . the middle class and by the rural masses."⁶⁹ The journalist correctly noted that Duvalier's definition of the revolution referred to the shift of power to the negroes from the mulattoes. Duvalier condemned the mulattoes as the worst of the Negro. However, he said that the mulattoes were now in jail, in exile, or "three metres underground."⁷⁰ In another statement, Duvalier described his 1957 victory as one which

marked the decisive step in our national history. It conceptualizes the indignant protestation of all scorned and forgotten social classes upon the shoulders of which repose the riches of an egoistic and privileged minority.⁷¹

68.

These speeches have been published in two volumes under the titles Francois Duvalier, La Marche à la présidence (Port-au-Prince: Presses Nationales d'Haiti, 1966), and _____, La Revolution au pouvoir (Port-au-Prince: Presses Nationales d'Haiti, 1966).

69. Duvalier, interview in Excelcoir as quoted in Hispanic American Report, Vol. 16, 1963 p. 869.

70. Duvalier, interviewed in Excelcoir as quoted in ibid.

71. Diederich and Burt, Papa Doc, p. 123.

He saw himself as the presidential leader of this black revolution, the chosen one, who had an historic mission to fulfill. In his own words:

I am an exceptional man . . . the kind the country could produce only once every 50 to 75 years. I will always go forward because I am a revolutionary, more than a head of state. It is not for nothing that I labored over the pages in history, sociology, and ethnology for so many years. I did it because I knew that I must fulfill a holy mission, a mission which will be carried out in full.⁷²

On November 12, 1964, he explained his duty to lead and protect his revolution to a crowd before the public execution of an army officer condemned for treason:

Dr. François Duvalier will fulfill his sacrosanct mission. He has crushed these plots and will always crush the attempts of the antipatriots. Duvalierism, leaning on the living forces of the nation, will crush any sacrilegious invasion of the sacred soil of the fatherland Thus will perish the antipatriots who want to put again the Haiti of Jean-Jacques Dessalines under the whip of the colonials. No force will stop⁷³ the invincible march of the Duvalier Revolution. . . .

Duvalier's reference to Dessalines was an attempt to identify his regime with the black tradition. It was also a means of attacking the mulattoes while maintaining black middle class support. Witness the following speech delivered to a crowd on the day he declared himself president-for-life.

What the government wants is that you must fight back, and watch the traitors . . . , those who betrayed Jean-Jacques Dessalines the great, those who betrayed General Salomon, those who betrayed General Soulouque, so that those traitors may know that now things have changed and that Dr. Duvalier is neither Dessalines, nor Soulouque, nor General Salomon, of whom he is, however, the pupil.⁷⁴

⁷². Le Nouveau Monde, 5 April, 1964, emphasis added.

⁷³. Diederich and Burt, Papa Doc, p. 312.

⁷⁴. Ibid., p. 281, emphasis added.

Thus he made constant use of the black legend, a part of the noiriste ideology.

Duvalier conceptualized his form of democracy as one befitting the traditions and mentalite' of his people:

Haitian [democracy] is not the German or French democracy. It is neither the Latin American or United States type of democracy. It is defined in full according to the ethnic background of the people, its history, its tradition, its sociology, all overflowing with humanism. . . in view of all these goals Haitian democracy is defined and redefined as a rational discipline with the revolution.⁷⁵

In a speech recorded by the July 28, 1964 edition of Le Nouveau Monde, he said that the tragedy of 1915 resulted from the country's adopting the wrong form of government. He insisted, then, that this disaster "affirms the adapting of the system to their temperament and their genius."⁷⁶ Duvalier's references to Leo Frobenius and Alexandre Baschmakoff in various speeches (most of them to illiterates and the poorly educated black middle class) demonstrate just how obsessed Duvalier had become with the writings of these two men. In a message delivered to the nation in 1966, he declared that "the Duvalier Revolution is a human Revolution. It carries with it - remember it always - its gods, its worship and its cosmogony in terms of the philosophy of Professor Alexandre Baschmakoff."⁷⁷ In a general article discussing the education of the masses, appearing September 10, 1967 in Nouveau Monde,

75. Ibid., p. 187.

76. Le Nouveau Monde, 28 July, 1964.

77. Francois Duvalier, "Message a la nation a l'occasion du cyclone Ines et de la Prochaine Competition Electorale a la veille du 1'an X de la Revolution Duvalieriste " (Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie de Campiegné, 1966), p. 55.

78. Le Nouveau Monde, 10 September, 1967.

Duvalier referred to the German intellectual school of Leo Frobenius and the existence of separate cultures and civilizations.⁷⁸ Duvalier seems, then, to be totally dependent upon his own tradition - his own philosophic development as expressed in his works - for the principles of his rule.

Certain curious actions by President Duvalier in his attempt to build a personality cult are foreseen by his earlier writing on leadership which stressed the need for a leader to embody the collective conscience of the peasants and the middle class. For example, a government-supported newspaper in Port-au-Prince features, on its front page, a two-column montage of Christ with his hands on the shoulders of Duvalier. The legend reads: "I have chosen him."⁷⁹ This picture, and one with the words "Ecce Homo" reflect the same motivation to be seen in the sale of plastic busts or pictures of Duvalier which had to be prominently displayed in the homes of all Haitians.⁸⁰ The prominent square in the capital was renamed "Place de la Revolution Duvalier,"⁸¹ and the neon lights near the capital's central common blinked the message:

I am the Haitian flag, One, Indivisible. François Duvalier.⁸²

Le Catechisme de la Revolution, a book containing litanies, hymns, prayers and doctrine was also an attempt to make Duvalier god-like by linking him not only with the Holy Trinity but to the great founders of

78. Le Nouveau Monde, 10 September, 1967.

79. Rotberg, Politics of Squalor, p. 233.

80. Hispanic American Report, Vol. 14, July, 1961, pp. 606-607.

81. Hispanic American Report, Vol. 16, September, 1963, p. 869.

82. Rotberg, Politics of Squalor, p. 233.

the Haitian nation. This book, as an example of personality-cult propaganda, deserves to be quoted in part:

(Q) Who are Dessalines, Toussaint, Christophe, Pétion and Estimé?

(A) Dessalines, Toussaint, Christophe, Pétion and Estimé are five founders of the nation who are found within François Duvalier.

(Q) Is Dessalines for life?

(A) Yes, Dessalines is for life in François Duvalier.

This same question and answer were listed for the other four historical figures.

(Q) Do we conclude then that there are six presidents for life?

(A) No, Dessalines, Toussaint, Christophe, Pétion and Estimé are five distinct chiefs of state but who form only one and the same president in François Duvalier.

There are pictures of the flag, of the president and his first lady, followed by the "Lord's Prayer":

Our Doc who art in the National Palace for life, hallowed be Thy name by present and future generations. Thy will be done at Port-au-Prince and in the provinces. Give us this day our new Haiti and never forgive the trespasses of the antipatriots who spit every day on our country; let them succumb to temptation, under the weight of their venom, deliver them not from any evil.⁸³

The writer demonstrates Duvalier's remarkable ability and in a literary sense unique approach to exploring and using all the means possible to link his leadership with others of the black tradition whom Duvalier considered moments of the "collective national conscience".

The color issue and Duvalier's black revolution are officially incorporated in the new flag (1964), the new coat of arms (1964), the

83. Diederich and Burt, Papa Doc, p. 283.

statue to the marron inconnu (1969), and the new Constitution (1964), all discussed below.⁸⁴ These actions, which were further attempts by Duvalier to put his ideological thought into action, were to guarantee him the support of the black middle class and masses.

There are conflicting stories concerning the colors of the original flag. It appears that the white portion of the French tri-color was removed in 1803, leaving a blue and red flag with vertical stripes of equal size, the blue next to the pole. Dessalines is credited with having later changed the blue portion to black. This black and red flag remained that of the black King Christophe's northern kingdom (1806-1820) while the mulatto president Alexandre Pétion's sucessionist Southern Republic (1806-1818) retained the blue and red colors. Pétion's colors ran horizontally. The mulatto President Jean-Pierre Boyer reunited the island after Christophe's death and retained the blue and red with the colors. Duvalier changed the blue and red flag in 1964 to black and red with the colors running vertically; the black portion of the flag was placed next to the flag pole. The positioning of the black next to the mast symbolizes the dominance of the blacks over the mulattoes. A statement by Duvalier best summarizes his reason for changing the flag:

At a time when the Haitian people give total adhesion to a mystique which joins that of the country's forefathers we must again consecrate this emblem. No standard can better express the joy of the nation of finding again the strong mystique, the faith of its ancestors, than the black-and-red flag of Dessalines.

84. This was the constitution that made Duvalier president for life.

85. Duvalier as quoted in Diederich and Burt, Papa Doc, p. 277.

Duvalier also changed the coat of arms originally designed by Pétion. The new design was a guinea fowl perched on a conch (the lambi which called the slaves to rebellion) at the upper left corner.

The statue commemorating the marron inconnu, represents all those slaves who escaped from their masters in the colony of Saint Domingue, and is yet another attempt by Duvalier to win mass support. He declared at the unveiling of the statue that

We negroes of Haiti constitute for the Negro-African masses of the universe the highest exponent, or a kind of common denomination of all national and racial consciousness.⁸⁶

In other words, the marron symbolizes the black masses and their determination to be free.

Article 197 of the new 1964 Constitution credits Duvalier with making possible the reconciliation of the political factions strongly opposed at the downfall of the 1950 regime; and with

realizing economic and financial stability of the state in spite of the pernicious action of the combined forces of the inside and outside, and of undertaking and completing the alphabetization of the masses and thus fulfilling the aspirations of the small and humble for more light and welfare.⁸⁷

The above reference to "the pernicious action of the combined forces of . . . the outside" is an oblique reference to U.S. interference.

Duvalier also dealt a severe blow to the Roman Catholic Church and to the various teaching orders. It was stated earlier that Duvalier and Denis had criticized the Church for their teaching of a false national consciousness and their traditional support of the elite.

⁸⁶. François Duvalier, Hommage au Marron Inconnu (Port-au-Prince, 1969), p. 56 as quoted in David Nicholls, "Embryo-Politics in Haiti," Government and Opposition, Vol. 6 (Winter, 1971), p. 85.

⁸⁷. Duvalier as quoted in Diederich and Burt, Papa Doc, pp. 282-283.

The Church's role in smashing voodoo artifacts was considered by the Griots as a direct attack upon the black's authentic culture. By 1957, still less than one-quarter of the priests working in Haiti were nationals, and all five diocesan bishops were foreigners.⁸⁸ Clerics and bishops came under attack on several occasions in 1960. The Church was said to support groups opposed to Duvalier. The result was the expulsion of several priests and an archbishop. Reasons for the expulsion of Msgr. Robert in 1962 were of interest inasmuch as they reflect Duvalier's philosophic position. The reason given for the expulsion was Robert's constant campaign against the practice of voodoo in his diocese (Gonaives), and also the role which he had played in the campaign of 1941. The New York Times, December 1, 1960, reviewed this role: "Under the cover of the anti-superstition drive, Bishop Robert organized or tolerated the pillaging of archeological and folklore riches of his diocese."⁸⁹ In 1964, the Haitian government did not renew its contract with the Canadian Jesuits. The years 1962 to 1965 witnessed more expulsions of nuns and priests and also the expulsion of Bishop Charles Voegli of the Episcopal Church. Duvalier clearly felt that enough had been accomplished by 1965. In 1966 a rapprochement occurred between Pope Paul VI and Duvalier. During this year, a native Haitian was enthroned as the first native Archbishop of Port-au-Prince and Haitian bishops were to fill all

88. David Nicholls, "Religion and Politics in Haiti," p. 403.

89. New York Times, November 17, 1962, p. 11.

other sees. Duvalier jubilantly reacted to these changes by announcing:

In all humanity, we consider today's ceremony as a further proof of legitimacy of our causes. The nation had gained the support of the highest moral authority in the world.⁹⁰

Duvalier had not only brought the Roman Catholic Church under his control, but the voodoo cults as well. This decentralized organization had hougans and bocars (voodoo priests) acting as relatively independent politically strong leaders in their districts. Such individuals were influential in shaping public opinion in the communities. Duvalier had successfully won their support by his action against the Roman Catholic Church and his promotion of their cult. Through both congenial methods and force he was able, like Soulouque before him, to unite these traditional leaders under his control. Often the hougans or priests served as leaders of Touton Macoutes (a group which acted as one of Duvalier's personal body guards).⁹¹ It is debatable whether Duvalier sincerely believed the voodoo religion to be an internal part of the Haitian culture. Most authors ignore his early writings on the subject and emphasize only his manipulation of the cult for political purposes. In any event, his emphasis on the voodoo beliefs won for him the political support of the black illiterate masses whom he often had "trucked" into Port-au-Prince for scheduled and unscheduled Mardi-Gras. It would appear, after a close examination of Haitian history, that no ruler since Dessalines (except possibly Soulouque) had so thoroughly personalized the state and nullified the effective influence of the traditional ruling class, with its repositories (both institutions and informal groups) of European civilization.

⁹⁰. New York Times, 28 November, 1966.

⁹¹. Rotberg, Politics of Squalor, p. 216.

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